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THE FINAL ‘INCOME’ REGULATIONS: THEIR MEANING
AND IMPORTANCE
By Jonathan G. Blattmachr and Mitchell M. Gans
Jonathan G. Blattmachr is a member of the New
York, California and Alaska Bars and a partner at
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP. Mitchell M.
Gans is a professor at Hofstra University School of Law.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the efforts of Ellen
K. Harrison, Esq., of Shaw Pittman, LLP, Stephen R.
Akers, Esq., of Bessemer Trust Company, N.A., Robert
B. Wolf, Esq., of Tener, Van Kirk, Wolf & Moore, P.C.,
and Professor Mark Ascher of the University of Texas
School of Law. Each labored over a draft of the article
and made very valuable contributions. Professor Ascher made two arguments requiring a response, which
have been incorporated in footnotes at the appropriate
juncture. It goes without saying that any errors in this
article are solely the responsibility of the authors. The
authors also thank Paula Prudenti, Milbank Tweed’s
law librarian, for her assistance.
In this report, Blattmachr and Gans explain how
new regulations promulgated in January make reaching and fundamental changes to some tax rules that
are dependent on the concept of fiduciary accounting
income (FAI) under local law. The new regulations,
they write, generally will respect a determination of
income made by (1) a trustee’s power granted under
state law to adjust from the income account to the
corpus account or the reverse, (2) a conversion of a
“pay all income” trust to a unitrust one pursuant to
state law, or (3) an allocation of capital gain to FAI
in some cases. The regulations also provide that
those conversions will not cause a beneficiary to be

treated as having made a gift or any party to have made
an income taxable exchange if the powers are exercised
or the conversion occurs pursuant to a state statute.
But, the authors note, the regulations indicate that adverse consequences may ensue if the safe harbor boundaries in defining income under the new regulations
are not followed. In addition, the regulations probably
have created a substantial advantage for administering
trusts pursuant to a power of adjustment rather than
converting them to unitrusts, in many cases.
Blattmachr and Gans believe it is hard to overemphasize the importance of the new regulations. Unfortunately, they write, the new regulations appear to contain direct contradictions on important matters, which
will likely perplex trustees and their advisors until
clarifications are made. Also, although the new regulations provide significant new guidance as to when capital gain of a trust may form part of DNI and, therefore,
may be taxed to a beneficiary, no guidance is provided
as to when, how, and to what degree the exercise of a
power to adjust from the corpus account to the income
account may result in capital gain becoming part of
DNI. The authors conclude that this omission means it
will be difficult for trustees and their advisors to determine, in some situations, how much the adjustment
should be.
Copyright Jonathan G. Blattmachr &
Mitchell M. Gans 2004.
All Rights Reserved.
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Fiduciaries are increasingly operating under a socalled unitrust or equitable-adjustment regime.1 Recognizing the importance of that pervasive change in the
trust-administration landscape, the Treasury recently
promulgated regulations designed to clarify the tax
consequences when one of these regimes is used.2 This
article examines those new regulations.

I. Introduction
It may seem surprising that often the tax consequence turns on the meaning of income, not in a tax
sense, but rather on its mean in g in a state law
fiducia ry-accoun ting s ens e. Perhap s e ve n more
surprising, the tax consequence is often dependent on
the meaning of fiduciary accounting income as determined under applicable local law or the terms of the
governing instrument (income will sometimes be
referred to as FAI). That means, of course, that the tax
consequence may be different if the transaction is
governed by the law of one jurisdiction as opposed to
another or under the terms of one document as opposed to another. In many ways, the new final regulations reinforce those disparate results.
The reason that the tax law is so connected to state
law definitions of income and corpus (as well as to the
governing document) is a combination of policy and
simplicity. The concept of a trust paying its income to
current (income) beneficiary and preserving corpus for
remainder beneficiary is so ingrained in our common
law that prescribing or relying on rules for tax matters
relating to trusts and estates, without regard to local
law notions of income and corpus, would have complicated much of the tax law. In terms of policy, as in
other areas, the code3 seeks to impose the tax burden
on the beneficiary entitled to receive the corresponding
economic benefit. (Usually the tax result will be the
same whether a rule is applied to a decedent’s estate
and its beneficiaries, or a trust and its beneficiaries.)
Examples of when the notion of fiduciary accounting income plays a significant role in determining a
federal tax result include determining: (1) whether tax
income of a trust will be taxed to the trust or a
beneficiary; (2) which beneficiary of a trust will be
taxed on trust tax income; (3) how much of a trust’s tax
income may be taxed to a trust beneficiary; (4) how
much of a depreciation or depletion deduction will be
allowed to a trust beneficiary; (5) whether transfers to
a trust qualify for the gift or estate tax marital deduc-

1
See generally Robert B. Wolf, “Total Return Trusts — Meeting Human Needs and Investment Goals Through Modern
Trust Design,” 10th Annual Estate Law Institute, Pennsylvania
Bar Institute, Vol. 1, at 450 et seq. (2003).
2
Barbara A. Sloan, “Section 643 Regulations: Use of NonCharitable Unitrusts and Other Issues Raised Under the Final
Regul ati ons,” 30 AC TEC Jo urn al 3 3 ( 2004 ); L i nda B.
Hirschson, “Final Section 643 Regulations Issued at Last, Permitting Total Return Investing,” New York Law Journal, May
1, 2004, Trusts and Estates Special Section 1.
3
Except where otherwise noted, “code” refers in this article to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Section references are to the code except where othewise noted.
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tion; (6) whether a trust qualifies as a charitable
remainder trust under section 664 of the code; (6)
whether a trust or other fund is a pooled income fund
within the meaning of section 642(c)(5); and (7)
whether a trust is an eligible shareholder of a subchapter S corporation. The list is not complete.

II. Different Notions
Subchapter J of the code sets forth the primary rules
for the income taxation of estates, trusts, and their
beneficiaries.4 Section 643(b) provides that the term
“income” (unless preceded by some other word or
words, such as “gross”) means income as determined
under local law and the terms of the governing instrument. That meaning had long been fleshed out in the
regulations under section 643 and had provided that
provisions of the governing instrument that “depart
from fundamental notions of income under local law”
would not be respected for purposes of subchapter J.
At the time those rules went into effect (in the 1954
code), trusts generally faced the same graduated income tax brackets as individuals. As a result, it was
usually preferable for the tax income of a trust to be
taxed to the trust rather than any trust beneficiary (who
might have other income). The regulations under section 643(b) reflected a concern that trusts would be
structured so distributions to a beneficiary could be
minimized or that some classes of income could be
taxed to the trust rather than to the beneficiary. The
regulations addressed that concern, providing that fundamental notions of accounting income could not be
ignored. They included an example illustrating how an
attempt to treat as corpus an item that would clearly
be defined as income under state law (such as interest
or dividends) would not be respected for subchapter J
purposes.5
Indeed, that concern about limiting the income that
would be taxed to the beneficiaries led to the development of the concept of “distributable net income,” or
“DNI” as it is commonly called, under section 643(a).
DNI is the taxable income of the estate or trust, subject
to adjustments. The adjustments reflect notions of what
should be taxable to the beneficiary and the trust or
estate. For example, because capital gain (a tax concept

4
However, many other rules on the income taxation of
estates, trusts, and their beneficiaries are in other subchapters.
See, e.g., section 167(d), setting forth rules for the apportionm e nt o f a dep re ci at i o n ded u cti o n be twee n i nco m e
beneficiaries of trusts and of estates and their fiduciaries.
5
The concern about using trusts as separate and independent taxpayers was also reflected by the earlier adoption
of the so-called “grantor trust” rules in subpart E of part 1
of subchapter J (under which the tax income of the trust may
be attributed directly to the grantor or sometimes to a
beneficiary essentially as though the trust does not exist) and
later adoption of the so-called “throwback” rules contained
in subpart D of part 1 of subchapter J (under which some tax
income not currently distributed to a trust beneficiary is
taxed later to the beneficiary when it is deemed distributed).
The throwback rules generally now apply only to non-U.S.
(or foreign) trusts.
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and not one traditionally found in state law notions of
FAI) is typically part of the proceeds of the sale or
exchange of an asset and, because under traditional
common-law notions proceeds of sale are principal (or
corpus), capital gain is not part of DNI as a general
rule. See section 643(a)(3). An item of tax income of an
estate or trust that is not part of DNI cannot be taxed
to a beneficiary but only to the estate or trust.
In short, by tying the taxation of trusts and estates
on one side, and beneficiaries on the other, to fundamental notions of income and corpus under state
law, the tax law reflected a reasonable method of administering the income tax system concerning those
entities and their beneficiaries.
The connection between FAI and tax consequence
goes beyond the income taxation of fiduciaries and
beneficiaries. Treatment for other tax purposes is dependent on FAI and, therefore, its meaning. For example, the most common forms of trusts that may qualify for the estate or gift tax marital deduction turn on
the current payment of FAI to the surviving spouse.
See, for example, section 2056(b)(7) and 2523(f). Nevertheless, for those (and some other) purposes, neither
the code nor the regulations prescribed rules or limitations based on the definition of accounting income. For
example, for a trust to qualify for the marital deduction
under sections 2056(b)(5) or (7) and 2523(e) or (f), the
trust must provide for the “income” to be paid at least
annually to the spouse. But, rather than defining income, the regulations had simply provided that the
trust must be structured so that the spouse is given
“substantially that degree of beneficial enjoyment of
the trust property during . . . life which the principles
of law of trusts accord to a person who is unqualifiedly
designated as the life beneficiary of a trust” and provided rules to establish that beneficial enjoyment (for
example, the spouse has to be able to make the trust
reasonably productive of income, as a general rule).
Treas. reg. section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(1).6
In any case, it is clear that different latitude (perhaps
in one sense more narrow, but in another sense more
broad) had been permitted in defining income in a
marital deduction trust than for purposes of subchapter
J. The mandatory treatment of income (actually, the
required treatment or status of the income beneficiary)
for marital deduction trust-qualification purposes
might be contrasted with the treatment of a so-called
“income-only” charitable remainder trust described in
section 664(b)(3), when qualification is not dependent
on the treatment or status of the unitrust-income
beneficiary but, apparently, on the meaning of income
un de r se ction 643 (b). Perhap s it is because the
charitable remainder trust provisions are part of subchapter J that such a trust’s treatment was prescribed
using the meaning of FAI as opposed to the treatment
of the unitrust recipient, but interests in charitable

6
Reg. section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(3) sets forth rules as to the
meaning of “income” for purposes of the marital deduction.
It is unclear to what degree, if any, those special rules for the
marital deduction continue to apply in light of the new final
regulations under section 643(b) defining income.
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remainder trusts may also qualify for the estate and
gift tax marital deduction. See section 2523(g) and
2056(b)(8).
That in turn might be contrasted with the treatment
of fiduciary accounting income for purposes of qualified domestic trusts (QDOTs) (a trust that may qualify
for the estate tax marital deduction when the surviving
spouse is not a U.S. citizen). With a QDOT, estate tax
is collected when the surviving spouse dies or, if earlier, when corpus is distributed (subject to exceptions)
to the spouse. Sections 2056(d), 2056A. Income, in a
fiduciary accounting sense, distributed by the QDOT
trustee to the surviving spouse is not subject to estate
tax (although it may be included in the spouse’s gross
income for U.S. income tax purposes).
For QDOTs, a new type of rule was adopted to reduce tax avoidance that might occur by having distributions be deemed FAI (which would not be subject
to estate tax) rather than corpus. The original QDOT
regulations provided, in effect, that the meaning of
income for QDOT purposes is the same as that under
section 643(b) but does not include capital gain. In
addition, the regulations provided that FAI does not
include any other item that would be allocated to corpus under applicable local law, regardless of any trust
provision to the contrary.7

III. The World of Trusts Changes
Most trusts provide that all income shall be distributed currently to a beneficiary — that is, they provide for a “straight” income interest. Corpus generally
is preserved for successor beneficiaries, although often
the trustee is given the discretionary authority to invade, or pay, corpus to the income beneficiary for any
purpose or a specified purpose. Hence, whether a
receipt or expense is allocated to income or corpus is
critical in determining what each class of beneficiaries
receives. Generally, income beneficiaries prefer greater
income and remainder beneficiaries prefer greater corpus, all other things being equal. Indeed, income
beneficiaries frequently “lobby” the trustee for more
income and urge the trustee to invest a greater portion
of the trust estate in fixed-income securities (for example, bonds), while corpus beneficiaries ask the
trustee to invest for more growth in value (for example,
equities).

7
When there is no specific statutory or case law regarding
the allocation of such items under the law governing the administration of the QDOT, the allocation was to be governed
by general principles of law (including any uniform state acts,
such as the Uniform Principal and Income Act, or any Restatements of applicable law). Reg. section 20.2056A-5(c)(2). Those
regulations went on to provide that except as otherwise provided in the regulations or IRS guidance (e.g., in a revenue
ruling), FAI does not include income in respect of a decedent
(IRD) within the meaning of section 691 (gross income to
which the decedent was entitled at death but not properly
included on the decedent’s final, or any other predeath, income tax return). Additional rules were provided for the allocation of income and corpus for payments from an IRA or
qualified plan to a QDOT.

893

(C) Tax Analysts 2004. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

Generally, a fiduciary must administer the trust impartially between the two classes of interests.8 Hence,
a fiduciary typically would invest a percentage of the
trust’s assets to earn growth and the balance to earn
income. Traditionally, the fiduciary tried to find a
“reasonable” balance between the two broad classes of
investments so as not to favor either class.
Several developments have changed the notion of
what is fairest to both classes of beneficiaries. The first
was the discovery (or acknowledgement) that overall
return will often be reduced if the reasonable balance
o f fa i rn e s s b e t w e e n t h e i n co me a n d c or p us
beneficiaries is maintained. The reason, based upon
empirical studies and theory, is that equity interests
tend to outperform debt interests in the long term (that
is, produce a greater overall return) and, in some
periods, different classes or mixes of assets produce the
greatest growth (consistent with a chosen level of risk).
Simply put, investments should be chosen based on
anticipated return and risk, not whether they will
generate corpus or income as a matter of FAI. Also,
increased sensitivity to the effect of inflation on the real
(or spending) value of both income and corpus has
occurred. As indicated, studies show that investing the
trust primarily in fixed income probably means that
the true spending power value of income is eroded by
inflation just as the real value of corpus probably will
be. One must also take into account the different tax
treatment that different types of income attract. All
other things being equal, long-term capital gain is more
favorably taxed than is ordinary tax income.9 Also,
making a decision to take action to obtain greater FAI
can be detrimental for both the income and the
remainder beneficiaries. For example, converting a
growth stock into cash so it can be invested to produce
greater FAI usually means payment of capital gains (or
ordinary income) tax, and that erodes what is in the
trust. In a sense, when that occurs, both the income
beneficiary and remainder beneficiary suffer: There is
a smaller base of wealth from which to derive current
profits (income) for the income beneficiary and,
likewise, the remainder beneficiary will have less value
generating a return. The reason is that the remaining
proceeds have to “work” so much harder just to “get
even” with the prior holdings.10 Further, investments
8

Restatement of Trusts (Third) section 183.
For federal tax purposes, qualified dividends through
2008 will be taxed at the same rate as is some long-term
capital gain. Section 1(h)(11). Capital gain has another advantage: timing of when the profit will be taxed. As a general
rule, no tax is due until the property is sold or exchanged,
which usually is in the control of its owner. That generally
is not true for other types of income received, such as dividends and interest.
10
For example, the trust holds a highly appreciated asset
worth $1 million. If the trust sells the asset and incurs a 25
percent gains tax, it will have only $750,000. Even if the asset
sold remained at $1 million, the $750,000 would have to
experience approximately the following net after-tax rates
over the following time-frames to get “back” to $1 million:
33 percent in one year; 15.5 percent each year for two years;
11 percent each year for three years; 7.5 percent each year for
9

(Footnote 10 continued in next column.)
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in assets that produce lower taxable returns (such as
long-term capital gain and, until 2009, qualified dividends) produce a greater net return, all other things
being equal.11 Yet almost all states had adopted the
Prudent Man (or, in some jurisdictions, the Prudent
Person) Act, which directed the trustee to invest so as
to produce a reasonable rate of income while preserving the corpus.
As a consequence, most states have now adopted
the Prudent Investor Act, which allows much more
flexibility in investing and, essentially, directs the trustee to pursue an overall investment strategy to enable
the trustee to make appropriate current and future distributions to or for the benefit of the beneficiaries under
the governing instrument, in accordance with risk and
return objectives reasonably suited to the entire
portfolio. See, for example, New York EPTL 11-2.3.
That, of course, enables the trustee to focus on maximizing return and risk, rather than on whether the
return will constitute FAI.
Also, many states have also adopted statutes under
which more flexibility in investing and fair treatment
of income and remainder beneficiaries is provided. See,
for example, New York’s EPTL article 11-A and Alaska
Statute 13.38.200 et seq. In a broad sense, those statutes
typically offer two choices to achieve those results.
First, they permit the trustee of a trust, subject to
limitations such as when a marital deduction trust is
involved, to adjust the amount of income and corpus
(essentially, by transferring assets in corpus to income
or vice versa) when an adjustment would be fair and
reasonable to all beneficiaries. For example, when a
larger portion of the trust is invested in growth (as
opposed to current generation of fiduciary accounting
income) than would traditionally occur, the fiduciary
may allocate proceeds of sale of growth assets to income to make up for the shortfall in income production
by the growth investment regime the trustee has adopted. It also appears that the trustee may exercise the
power to adjust from corpus to income even if there
are no proceeds of sale. Similarly, if the trustee has
invested a larger portion in income production (which
might occur when short-term interest rates again increase dramatically as they did in the late 1970s and
early 1980s), the trustee might allocate part of what
would be income (for example, interest) to corpus at
least to the extent that corpus may maintain its spending power. It appears certain that the amount allocated
from the corpus account to the income account becomes income and the amount allocated from the in-

four years; 6 percent each year for five years; 5 percent each
year for six years. As indicated, those are after tax returns. If
the trust faced a 25 percent tax, the gross returns (pretax)
would have to be increased by one-third. Also, if the original
asset grew at any rate (e.g., 2 percent per year), the $750,000
would have to work that much “harder.”
11
Although many perceive municipal bonds as producing
tax exempt income (see section 103), the return on them typically is already “tax affected.” That is, the fact that the yield
is not subject to tax means, all other things (such as risk)
being equal, the tax-exempt bonds pay a lower yield.
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come account to the corpus account becomes corpus.12
Hence, an adjustment from the corpus account to the
income account is not an invasion of corpus. This treatment under local law of the adjustment payment is
important for several tax reasons, as will be discussed
below.
It is important to note that the power to adjust is not
dependent on realized or unrealized appreciation in
the trust estate but rather a reasonable determination
by the trustee that a portion of corpus should be allocated to income or the reverse based upon the trustee’s
dut y of imp ar tia lit y t o t h e in com e an d corpus
beneficiaries. Thus, an equitable adjustment from corpus to income pursuant to a power to adjust may be
made in any of the following contexts: (1) when gain
has been realized; (2) when gain has occurred but not
yet been realized; or (3) when no gain has occurred.
Second, legislation enacted in some states (for example, New York and Alaska)13 contemplates that the
trustee (or the court) will be permitted to convert a
con ve ntion al income trus t t o a un itrust, w hich
redefines FAI so that it is equal to a fixed percentage
of the value of the trust’s assets. See, for example, New
York EPTL 11-2.4. The unitrust will pay the amount
determined by its percentage and current value regardless of whether the FAI, as conventionally understood,
is greater or less than the unitrust amount and regardless of whether there is realized or unrealized appreciation.14

IV. The Treasury Responds
The widespread adoption of unitrust and equitableadjustment legislation has had such a profound effect
on the administration of trusts that the Treasury
Department has adopted new regulations that deal
with the meaning of FAI for purposes of section 643(b)
and other sections of the code. Generally, the regulations are effective January 2, 2004, and apply to tax
years ending after that date. The balance of this article
will discuss these new regulations and point out planning opportunities and potential adverse consequences
that they may produce.

tunities in others. Sometimes they create the need for
prompt action.
The regulations adopt, in defining FAI, the same
first sentence as in the prior regulations: Income is to
be determined “under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local law.” Reg. section
1.643(b)-1. However, the next sentence contains what
may be a subtle but important change. The prior regulations provided that provisions in the governing instrument that “depart fundamentally from concepts of
local law in the determination of what constitutes income
are not recognized” for federal tax purposes. (Emphasis added.) The new regulations provide that trust
provisions that “depart fundamentally from traditional
principles of income and principal will generally not” be
recognized for those purposes. (Emphasis added.)
Hence, there may be a shift from the specific local law
that governs the trust to some general “traditional”
notion of income and principal untethered to the law
of the jurisdiction governing the trust. The preamble,
however, appears to deny that a shift has occurred. It
claims that reg. “section 1.643(b)-1 has always provided that the allocation to principal, under the terms
of the governing instrument, of items that traditionally
would be allocated to income will not be respected for
purposes of section 643(b).”15 (Emphasis added.) But
unlike the prior regulations, which contained no exception,16 th e fin al regulations, by use of the word
“gen erally,” seem to imply some new or added
flexibility.
One of the issues that apparently had previously
perplexed the IRS in that regard concerned the nearly
universal rule under state law permitting the instrument to override the default statutory rule. Virtually
all state statutes defining income and principal provided that the definitions or rules under the governing
instrument were controlled.17 See, for example, New
York EPTL 11-2.1(a). The state statutes then provided
various default rules. The reliance by the new regulations on “traditional” notions of income and principal
seems to suggest that the IRS will focus on traditional
default state rules. It is uncertain whether those rules
will be general ones (such as those in the Uniform

V. New Meaning of ‘Income’
The final regulations are thorough and were obviously carefully considered, although it seems that
sometimes alternative treatment might have been
preferable. In any case, they present new tax risks in
some situations and provide new planning oppor-

12
See Uniform Principal and Income Act, section 104 and
underlying commentary.
13
The Uniform Principal and Income Act includes no
unitrust conversion provision.
14
It is interesting that in New York, the statute prohibits a
trustee from exercising the power to adjust that reduces the
income interest in a trust that requires all income to be paid
at least annually to a spouse and for which an estate or gift
tax marital deduction is claimed, but no such restriction is
included for the conversion of a marital deduction trust to a
unitrust. Compare New York EPTL 11-2.3(b)(5)(C) with 11-2.4.
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15
The preamble mentions the standard of “traditional”
three times.
16
That is, under the prior regulations, no departure from
a fundamental local law determination of income would be
respected in any case.
17
See, e.g., LTR 8521060, concluding that a provision
specifying for the increase in value of a zero coupon bond
(that is, one that pays no current interest, is sold at a discount
from face value and pays face value at maturity) to be
fiduciary accounting income in an income-only charitableremainder unitrust would be respected (that is, the trust
would be a valid charitable-remainder trust under section
664(b)(3)) when the default state law rule would have allocated the increase in value of the bond to corpus, but that
was the default rule to the primary state rule that the provisions of the governing instrument determine what is income
and what is corpus. Neither a private letter ruling nor a
technical advice memorandum may be cited or used as precedent. Section 6110(k)(3).
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Principal and Income Act) or the traditional rules (as
opposed, perhaps, to the current rules) of the jurisdiction involved.18
However traditional notions of income and corpus
are determined, the new regulations reflect two emerging concepts under local law. First, they embrace the
unitrust regime. Specifically, they provide that an allocation of amounts between income and corpus under
applicable local law will be respected if it provides for
a reasonable apportionment between the income and
remainder beneficiaries of the total return, including
ordinary and tax-exempt income, capital gains, and
appreciation. The regulations specify that a state statute
that provides for a unitrust amount of no less than 3
percent and no more than 5 percent of the trust’s fair
market value is a reasonable apportionment of the
trust’s total return. Apparently, it is not necessary that
the statute fix the unitrust rate. The IRS has already
ruled that, when the statute permits the trustee to
choose a rate between 3 percent and 5 percent, any rate
chosen by the trustee within that range will satisfy the
regulation.19 Second, the regulations provide that a
state statute that permits the trustee to make adjust-

18
The new rules, in contrast to the prior ones, set forth some
of the consequences of having a provision in a governing
instrument defining income and corpus that will not be
respected for tax purposes. The final regulations state that a
trust required to distribute its FAI currently will not be treated
as such for purposes of determining its level of personal exemption under section 642(b) (under which the trust receives
a larger personal exemption than one that is not required to
distribute its income currently) or for purposes of determining
the tax treatment under section 651 of distributions to the
beneficiary by the trust, if the governing instrument defines
ordinary dividends and interest as principal.
19
See LTR 200417014, Doc 2004-8774, 2004 TNT 80-53. In the
ruling, the state statute authorized a conversion to a unitrust
with a payout of between 3 percent and 5 percent. The trustee
converted the trust to a 3 percent unitrust. The IRS concluded
that the conversion would not cause a loss of grandparenting
for GSTT purposes and would not cause any party to be
treated as making a taxable gift or an income-taxable exchange. As will be discussed, different circumstances probably
will determine whether a conversion at all is appropriate and,
when it is, what rate should be selected. For example, as is
discussed below, it may be appropriate for a QDOT to be
converted to a 5 percent payout. That will tend to maximize
the amount that may be distributed to the surviving spouse
free of estate tax. On the other hand, it might be appropriate
to convert a QSST to a 3 percent unitrust where it is desirable
to minimize distributions to the current income beneficiary
to maximize the amount in a trust that is exempted from
generation-skipping transfer taxation. Similarly, if the trust
must distribute all of its income currently and is not subject
to state and local income tax but the income of the income
beneficiary is subject to those taxes, it might be better, if a
conversion occurs, to choose only a 3 percent payout percentage. Given that the choice of an optimal unitrust rate will
depend on the circumstances in each case, locating a trust in
a state with legislation authorizing a 3-5 percent range may
prove to be advantageous. Indeed, to compete more effectively,
states with fixed-rate unitrust statutes may eventually decide
to adopt a more flexible 3-5 percent approach.
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ments between income and principal to fulfill the
trustee’s duty of impartiality between income and
remainder beneficiaries is generally a reasonable apportionment of the trust’s total return (implying that
it will be respected for tax purposes so that after any
adjustment, fiduciary accounting income will be
treated as being paid).

Given the regulations’ rejection of an
instrument-authorized unitrust or
power-to-adjust regime, they take a
surprisingly flexible approach in
permitting discretionary allocations of
realized gain to FAI.
The preamble to the final regulations goes on to
acknowledge that other actions may constitute applicable state law, such as a decision by the highest
court of the state announcing a general principle or
rule of law that would apply to all trusts administered
under that state’s laws. Cf. Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).20 However, the regulations
themselves contain examples involving only state
statutes and fail to track the reference to case law in
the preamble. That suggests, as a matter of caution,
that anyone creating a trust who intends that it be
administered under a power to adjust or a unitrust
regime should create it under the laws of a state that
has adopted those rules by statute if adverse tax effects
could otherwise arise. In any case, conversion to a
unitrust or the exercise of a power to adjust, at least
under a state statute (if not under state case law), will
be respected, according to the regulations, whether or
not the trust requires fiduciary accounting income to
be distributed.21
As indicated, the preamble rejected a request by
commentators that a unitrust or equitable-adjustment
power be respected if authorized solely by the governing instrument. In other words, if an instrument authorizes the trustee to make adjustments between income
and corpus exactly as the Uniform Act specifies or
defines income as a unitrust amount exactly as some
state statutes do but state law does not grant that
authority, the trust will not be treated as either being
required to pay all of its FAI or as having paid it (if the

20
The preamble indicates that a trust-specific lower court
decree will not be respected if not supported by developed
state case law.
21
Reg. section 1.643(b)-1. This latter point is important, for
example, for reasons other than the treatment of distributions
under section 651 or the personal exemption under section
642(b). For example, to constitute a qualified subchapter S
trust (an eligible shareholder of an S corporation), the trust
must distribute all of its fiduciary accounting income even if
not required to do so by its terms. Also, depreciation experienced by a trust is allocated between the trust and the
beneficiaries based on the FAI allocated to each, although the
regulations provide no example of such an effect for a trust
other than one required to distribute its income currently. See
section 167(d).
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amount paid is more or less than traditionally determined FAI). The regulations probably should have
adopted a different rule and provided that the trust
will be treated as being required to pay all of its FAI
or having paid it. Indeed, one might argue that the
adoption of the “traditional income” rule, which
smacks of a historic income rule, is arguably inconsistent with the adoption of the new rule that permits FAI
to be defined using new rules (power to adjust and
unitrust), neither of which is traditional. In fact, the
regulations’ limited acceptance of a power to adjust
and the unitrust rules will force property owners who
wish their trustees to be able to administer the trust
under the rules to forum shop — that is, create trusts
under the laws of states that have expressly adopted
those rules by legislation. And in policy terms, the
regulations’ overemphasis on state law will have the
unintended consequence of forcing states to enact
unitrust and power-to-adjust legislation to avoid the
loss of trust business.22
Given the regulations’ rejection of an instrumentauthorized unitrust or power-to-adjust regime, they
take a surprisingly flexible approach in permitting discretionary allocations of realized gain to FAI. Even if
neither state statutes nor case law grants the trustee a
discretionary power to allocate gain to FAI, the regulations will respect the allocation if the governing instrument permits it (if state law does not prohibit it).
The only requirement is that the trustee exercise that
power reasonably and impartially. As will be discussed
below, this authorization creates planning opportunities that other aspects of the regulations were apparently designed to preclude. As a result, the regulations unwittingly create an incentive to create trusts
with that kind of discretionary provision rather than a
unitrust. Accordingly, the regulations may have unintentionally created a competitive disadvantage for the
unitrust regime.
The regulations create a safe harbor permitting a
“switch” between methods of determining trust income authorized by state statute without triggering a
recognition event for income tax purposes under section 1001. They further provide that the switch will not
be a taxable gift by the grantor or by any of the
beneficiaries. On the other hand, they provide that a
switch not authorized by state statute but valid under
state law may constitute a recognition event under section 1001 or a taxable gift, depending on the facts and
circumstances. In other words, if a local court authorizes a switch from a straight income trust to a unitrust
trust or authorizes a trustee of a straight income trust
to exercise a power to adjust that is not authorized by
state statute, the IRS may take the position that the
beneficiary has made an income-taxable exchange (for
example, of an income interest for a unitrust interest)
o r ha s m a de a t a x a b le gi ft (s u c h a s whe n th e
beneficiary’s income interest has a greater value than
the value of the unitrust interest). The generation22
See Mitchell M. Gans, “Federal Transfer Taxation and the
Role of State Law: Does the Marital Deduction Strike the
Proper Balance?,” 48 Emory L.J. 871 (1999) (arguing that an
overemphasis on state law can be problematic).
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skipping transfer tax regulations issued earlier had provided that a conversion of an income interest to an interest providing the beneficiary with the greater of income
or a unitrust percentage would not cause the trust to lose
“grandparenting” protection from the GSTT. No doubt
many practitioners read those earlier regulations as permitting the conversion without any adverse tax consequences. Indeed, it seems that the Treasury should have
warned practitioners that the conversion might have
other adverse tax effects. Therefore, the Treasury or the
IRS should consider an announcement providing that
conversions similar to the one authorized in the GSTT
regulations will be “safe harbored” from income and gift
tax consequences if the conversion occurred before the
date of issuance of the new income regulations.23
As mentioned above, a state statute providing that
income is a unitrust amount of no less than 3 percent
or more than 5 percent of the trust’s fair market value
is a reasonable apportionment of the trust’s total return
and will be respected under the regulations. That
seems to be a safe harbor and does not per se foreclose
a lower or higher unitrust percentage from being a
reasonable apportionment. If market rates of return fell
off dramatically, a lower unitrust percentage might be
more reasonable than 3 percent. Similarly, if market
rates of return increased dramatically, a unitrust percentage in excess of 5 percent might be viewed as more
reasonable. In fact, when the U.S. economy experiences
high inflation in the future, a 5 percent unitrust payment to someone designated as the income beneficiary
might be viewed as unreasonably and unfairly low.
Perhaps when the state statute (to fall under the
regulatory safe harbor) provides for the trustee or the
court to convert an income interest into a unitrust payment of between 3 percent and 5 percent, the trustee
could “revert” to the traditional concept of income or,
if permitted by state statute, convert to the equitable
apportionment between income and corpus. Nevertheless, it seems that the regulations might have acknowledged that a unitrust tied to the current interest rate
under section 7520 is per se reasonable. For example,
because a pure FAI interest is valued under section
7520 as equal to the current rate promulgated under
that section (and is equal to 120 percent of the current
midterm AFR rounded to the nearest even two-tenths
of one percent), it seems that the regulations should
have provided a safe harbor conversion to a unitrust
equal to the current section 7520 rate.24 In fact, considering that Congress prescribed in section 664 a min23
While the IRS took the position in LTR 200231011, Doc
2002-17961, 2002 TNT 150-29, after the issuance of the GSTT
regulations that a court-approved settlement under which an
annuitant received a unitrust interest instead of the annuity
stream constituted an income-taxable exchange of the
beneficiary’s interest under Cottage Savings v. United States,
499 U.S. 554 (1991), taxpayers could not reasonably have been
expected to infer that the conversion contemplated in the
GSTT regulations might also constitute a taxable event under
section 1001 or constitute a taxable gift.
24
A rational argument may be maintained that valuing an
income interest using the section 7520 rate is almost always
inappropriate because the section 7520 rate actually represents a return of both income and appreciation.
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imum 5 percent unitrust payment from a charitable
remainder trust, it seems odd that the new income regulations would make 5 percent the safe harbor maximum.

VI. Distributable Net Income and Capital Gain
The regulations revise the calculation of “distributable
net income” (DNI) in many cases when the trust realizes
capital gain. DNI plays two roles under the code: (1) it
limits the maximum amount of the trust’s (or an estate’s)
income that may be allocated to (that is, included in the
gross income of) a beneficiary; and (2) it determines the
tax character or flavor of trust distributions that a
beneficiary must include in gross income. Trust income
(in a tax sense), if not included in DNI, cannot be included
in the gross income of a beneficiary.25 DNI is the trust’s
taxable income subject to adjustments. One of the most
important adjustments concerns capital gain. Under the
code, capital gain is excluded from DNI26 (on the theory
that generally it is allocated to corpus and therefore
should not be allocated to an income beneficiary for income tax purposes) unless it is allocated to FAI27; or, if
allocated to corpus, is paid, credited, or required to be
distributed to any beneficiary during the year; or is paid,
permanently set aside, or to be used for a charitable purpose specified in section 642(c).
The prior regulations provided some guidance,
beyond the words in the code, for when capital gain
allocated to corpus would form part of DNI and, therefore, could be included in a beneficiary’s gross income.
T h e i m p or t a n c e o f t h a t d e t e rm i n a t i o n i s n ow
heightened because of the increased number of cases
in which, by use of a unitrust or power to adjust,
amounts in excess of DNI (if determined without
rega rd to capit al g ain ) will be distributed to a
beneficiary. The circumstances in which capital gain
will be included in DNI by having it allocated to FAI
are not without limit.28 The exercise of a power to ad25
One might contend that that statement is overly broad
and that trust income not included in DNI can be taxed to a
beneficiary under the grantor trust rules, that is section 678.
However, it seems that that income is not income of the trust
but income of the beneficiary from inception. Cf. Rev. Rul.
85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
26
Capital gain is “automatically” added to DNI of a foreign
(non-U.S.) trust.
27
Capital gain may, however, be allocated to income in
several cases. One is when the trustee invests an asset
received as income rather than immediately distributing it.
Any capital gain produced by the asset while in the hands of
the trustee probably would be allocated to the trust’s income
account under default state rules. A second is when state law
allocates a portion of the proceeds to income upon the sale
of an unproductive asset and a proportionate part of the
proceeds may consist of capital gain realized for income tax
purposes. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 85-116, 1985-2 C.B. 174.
28
See, e.g., TAM 8728001. Neither a private letter ruling nor
a technical advice memorandum may be cited or held as
precedent. Section 6110(R)(3). It is worth noting that several
tax provisions deal with a power to allocate receipts (and
disbursements) between FAI and corpus but without referring to an allocation of capital gain. See, e.g., section 674(b)(8),
reg. section 20. 2041-1(b)(1); reg. section 25.2514-1(b)(1); reg.
section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(4).
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just to increase the amount of FAI or the use of a
unitrust regime will not necessarily cause capital gain
to be included in DNI. Moreover, the circumstances in
which capital gain will be included in DNI by reason
of being allocated to corpus have changed.
The new regulations provide that gains from the sale
or exchange of capital assets may be included in DNI,
subject to additional requirements discussed below, in
three circumstances: (1) when allocated to fiduciary accounting income; (2) when allocated to corpus but treated
consistently by the fiduciary on the trust’s books, records,
and tax returns as part of a distribution to a beneficiary;
or (3) when allocated to corpus but actually distributed to
the beneficiary or used by the fiduciary in determining
the amount that is distributed or required to be distributed
to a beneficiary. However, there is an additional prerequisite. For capital gain to be included in DNI, the allocation
must occur: (1) by a mandatory direction under local law
and the governing instrument; or (2) pursuant to the
reasonable and impartial exercise of discretion by the
fiduciary under a power granted under local law or under
the governing instrument (if not prohibited by local law).29
But it should be noted that the regulations do not
by their terms cover the circumstances when: (1) state
law or the governing instrument (but not both) mandates the allocation of capital gain to income or corpus
(although one of the examples is inconsistent with the
text on this issue30); or (2) the fiduciary has the power
under state law or the governing instrument to allocate
the capital gain to income or corpus but does not exercise the power 31 or exercises it in a way that is not
29
Prof. Ascher argues that the DNI regulation cannot be
read literally. In his view, if the instrument or the statute
contains the necessary mandate, it will be respected when
computing DNI. As discussed, there is some support for that
argument in Example 4. In the example, the instrument directs
that all income be distributed currently. It also directs that
capital gain be allocated to income. Based on this latter direction, the example concludes that capital gain will be included
in DNI even though state law does not also require the allocation. See also Example 11 (in which a unitrust amount is required to be paid currently). It is not, however, clear whether
Example 4 should be read as a categorical rejection of the word
“and” in the text of the regulation. For example, given the
considerable restrictions the regulations impose on the inclusion of gain in DNI in the case of a unitrust or a discretionary invasion of corpus, it is difficult to predict whether the
IRS will extend Example 4 to a completely discretionary trust.
Perhaps, a better reading of the regulation is that generally
the word “and” should be understood as carrying a conjunctive meaning with an exception for the particular cases in
which the examples take a contrary approach. In any event,
further clarification is necessary.
30
See Example 4 of reg. section 1.643(a)-3(a).
31
To illustrate, if the trustee has the authority to allocate gain
between income and principal and fails to exercise that discretion, the gain will presumably be allocated pursuant to the state
law default rule. This, however, seems to foreclose having the
capital gain be part of DNI given that the allocation is not
mandated by both the instrument and state law. Nor will Example 4 be of any assistance given this distinction: In the
example, the instrument is mandatory, whereas in the posited
hypothetical the default rule is invoked only when the trustee
chooses not to, or fails to, exercise the discretion.
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impartial and reasonable. In the latter two circumstances, it seems that capital gain cannot form part of
DNI. That result seems odd, if not wrong, at least sometimes.
The requirement that the instrument and state law
both direct how the allocation is to be made is particularly difficult to understand. Indeed, as indicated
and as will be further discussed, it is inconsistent with
one of the examples and with an outstanding revenue
ruling.

A. Allocating Capital Gain to FAI
For capital gain to be in DNI where it is allocated to
FAI, the allocation must be “pursuant to the terms of
the governing instrument and applicable local law, or
pursuant to a reasonable and impartial exercise of discretion by the fiduciary in accordance with a power
granted to the fiduciary by applicable local law or by
the governing instrument if not prohibited by applicable local law.” (Emphasis added.) Reg. section
1.643(a)-3(a). However, as noted below, at least one
example provided in the regulations does not remain
faithful to these rules.32
1. Allocating capital gain to FAI by the terms of the
instrument and local law. It is interesting that the regulations do not expressly provide that capital gain will
be included in DNI if allocated to FAI under applicable
local law (when the governing instrument is silent). It
seems implausible that capital gain allocated to income
pursuant to a default state law rule (when the instrument is silent on the allocation) will not cause that gain
to be in DNI. The Service itself has, in the past, not
required that the instrument restate the rule in the
statute. In Rev. Rul. 85-116 33 the Service concluded that
a portion of capital gain was included in DNI when the
state underproductive property statute allocated a portion of proceeds to income.34 The fact that the instrum e n t d i d n o t e c h o t h e s t a t u t o r y r e q u ire m en t
apparently was not significant.
Moreover, the apparent rejection of having capital
gain included in DNI when the capital gain is required
by state law to be allocated to income (but not also
required by the governing instrument) may sometimes
be inconsistent with the new definition of FAI under
reg. section 1.643(b)-1. Because the regulations suggest
that all items “traditionally” allocated to income must
be treated as income for tax purposes. And yet items
of capital gain traditionally treated under state law as
income, if not also treated as income under the governing instrument, will not be treated as income when
computing DNI.
It is also interesting to note that new Example 4 in
reg. section 1.643(a)-3 is inconsistent with the text. In
the example, capital gain is allocated to FAI under a
provision in the governing instrument and not also

32

See id.
1985-2 C.B. 174.
34
This revenue ruling was not revoked or even mentioned
in connection with the promulgation of the regulations, suggesting that it remains viable.
33
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required under local law (although not in violation of
local law). Despite the requirement in the text of the
regulation that the allocation must be required by local
law and the instrument, the example concludes that the
capital gain is included in DNI. The example also
seems inconsistent with the new definition of fiduciary
accounting income under reg. section 1.643(b)-1. Under
the regulation, as a general rule, an allocation to income or corpus that is not a traditional allocation will
not be respected for tax purposes. Generally, capital
gain is a tax concept that has no relevance for state
fiduciary law purposes. And appreciation in the value
of corpus traditionally is allocated under state law to
corpus. The regulations, however, go on to create an
exception under which realized capital may be allocated to income and be respected for tax purposes if
under the local law and the governing instrument or
under an impartial and reasonable exercise of fiduciary
discretion. As indicated, however, Example 4 inexplicably respects an allocation of capital gain to FAI
even though not mandated by state law and not made
pursuant to the exercise of fiduciary discretion. In any
case, as will be discussed below, the example may provide a significant planning opportunity for determining whether, or the extent to which, capital gain will
be taxed to the trust or to the beneficiary.
2. Allocating capital gain to FAI by fiduciary discretion. In any case, as stated, for the allocation to FAI to
cause gain to form part of DNI if by an exercise of
discretion by the fiduciary, the discretion must be both
“reasonably and impartially” exercised. Unfortunately,
no definition of “reasonable” or “impartial” is offered
in the regulations.35 Th e u s e of t h e co n ju n ct ive
“reasonable and impartial” might be contrasted with
the new definition-of-income regulation. That regulation provides that “a state statute that permits the trustee to make adjustments between income and principal
to fulfill the trustee’s duty of impartiality between the
income and remainder beneficiaries is generally a
reasonable apportionment of the total return of the
trust.” That suggests, in other words, that an impartial
allocation is per se reasonable. On the other hand, the
regulation’s last sentence tracks the language of the
DNI regulation: “An allocation to [fiduciary accounting] income of all or a part of the gains from the sale
or exchange of trust assets will generally be respected
if the allocation is made either pursuant to the terms
of the governing instrument and applicable local law,
or pursuant to a reasonable and impartial exercise of a
discretionary power granted to the fiduciary by applicable local law or the governing instrument, if not
prohibited by applicable local law.” (Emphasis added.)
Reg. section 1.643(b)-1 (last sentence).
Perhaps when the regulations use the terms “reasonable” or “impartial” they intend to create a federal

35

The regulations obviously borrow the word “impartial”
from section 103(b) of the Uniform Income and Principal Act.
They may also borrow the word “reasonable” from that section as well, although, as discussed below, the reasonable
standard and the impartial standard may be federal ones.
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standard of reasonableness that will be applied independently of any state standard.36 Thus, even if a
federal court were to agree that the allocation was
reasonable and impartial as a matter of applicable state
fiduciary law, the court might nevertheless deny the
allocation of capital gain to DNI on the grounds that
the standard was not satisfied as a matter of federal
law.

Contrary to the drafters’ assumption,
an allocation of capital gain to FAI in a
nonunitrust context might create a tax
effect without any corresponding
economic effect.
The regulations distinguish between an allocation
of capital gain to FAI when the trust is a unitrust as
opposed to another type of trust. In a unitrust, the
allocation to income (whether pursuant to requirements of local law and the instrument or pursuant to
the reasonable and impartial exercise of discretion by
the fiduciary) must be exercised consistently, and the
amount allocated cannot be greater than the excess of
the unitrust amount over DNI determined without
regard to capital gain. No similar consistency requirement is imposed for an allocation of capital gain to FAI
outside the unitrust context — apparently whether or
not the instrument requires that FAI be distributed. In
noting that one commentator said that a discretionary
power to allocate capital gain to income should not
have to be exercised consistently, the Preamble states
that the “exercise of the power [of allocation] generally
affects the actual amount that may or must be distributed to the income ben eficiaries and affects
whether the trust or the beneficiary will be taxed on
the capital gains. Thus . . . the power does not have to
be exercised consistently, as long as it is exercised
reasonably and impartially.”
Contrary to the drafters’ assumption, however, an
allocation of capital gain to FAI in a nonunitrust context might create a tax effect without any corresponding economic effect. For example, the trust allows the
trustee to distribute all or any part of income or corpus
or make no distribution at all. The trust receives $100
of interest income that will be included in DNI and is
allocated under state law to FAI. The trust also realizes
a $200 capital gain that the trustee allocates to income
under a power granted by state law or the governing
instrument. As a result, the capital gain is included in
DNI. If the trustee distributes $300 to the beneficiary,
the beneficiary will include the $100 of interest income
and the $200 of capital gain in gross income under
section 661. If the trustee distributes any lesser amount,
only a proportionate part of DNI will be included in
the beneficiary’s gross income. It seems that amount
included in the beneficiary’s gross income will consist

36
Cf. White v. U.S., 853 F. 2d 107 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted
489 U.S. 1051 (1989), and then dismissed 493 U.S. 5 (1989) (re:
attorney fee deductibility under section 2053).
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of one-third interest and two-thirds capital gain. Perhaps the IRS will contend37 that to the extent the trustee
has distributed less than the sum of FAI (determined
with the capital gain), the allocation of capital gain to
income is not reasonable and impartial. That could
mean, for instance, that in the foregoing example, if the
trustee distributed only $175, only $75 of the capital
gain (that is, the amount in excess of FAI determined
without regard to the gain) would be treated as being
in DNI.
3. Having capital gain included in DNI where it is
allocated to corpus. As stated above, the inclusion of
gain in DNI may also occur if the gains are allocated
to corpus but are either: (1) treated consistently by the
fiduciary on the trust’s books, records, and tax returns
as part of a distribution to a beneficiary; or (2) actually
distributed to the beneficiary or used by the fiduciary
in determining the amount that is distributed or required to be distributed to the beneficiary. But, as in
an allocation of capital gain to income, these two rules
apply only if the gains are so treated or so distributed
(a) under the terms of the governing instrument and
applicable local law, or (b) under a reasonable and
impartial exercise of discretion by the fiduciary in
accordance with a power granted to the fiduciary by
applicable local law or by the governing instrument if
not prohibited by applicable local law.
4. Detailed examples of when capital gain forms part
of DNI. Meaningful additional guidance is provided
through the 14 examples under reg. section 1.643(a)3(e) that illustrate the foregoing principles of when
capital gain will form part of DNI. The examples
manifest that some exercises of discretion by a trustee
must be consistent, in effect, requiring the trustee to
make an irrevocable election. It is, unfortunately, unclear how these rules apply to an executor. For instance,
the rule that provides for capital gains to be included
in DNI when it is allocated to corpus requires that it
be consistently so treated by the “fiduciary” (perhaps
including an executor). But that consistent treatment
must be manifested on the “trust’s” (with no mention
of an estate’s) books, records, and tax returns as part
of a distribution to a beneficiary.38 Moreover, it is unclear whether an executor’s treatment of capital gain
would bind the testamentary trustee.
In Example 1, the trustee makes a discretionary invasion of principal for the income beneficiary, allocates

37
The argument the IRS might make could be based on two
grounds. First, it might invoke the doctrine of substance over
form. Second, it might argue that allocation of realized gain
to income, under the regulation, contemplates an actual distribution. This second argument is consistent with Example 4
of reg. section 1.643(a)-3(a) (respecting the allocation of gain
to income when the instrument required the distribution of
all income).
38
Perhaps the thought is that an executor cannot consistently treat gain as part of distributions to beneficiaries either
because an executor does not usually make multiple distributions to a beneficiary or because the administration of an
estate usually is too limited in time for the treatment to be
consistent.
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all capital gains from a sale during the year to corpus
(the example does not specify whether the trustee was
permitted to allocate it to FAI) and does not exercise
the discretionary power (apparently granted under the
instrument) to “deem” discretionary distributions of
corpus as being made from capital gains. Example 1
concludes that the capital gains are not included in DNI
and states that in future years the trustee “must treat
all discretionary distributions as not being made from
any realized capital gains.” The latter statement is
probably overly broad. If, for example, the trustee exercised the trustee’s discretion to pay corpus to the
beneficiary by paying all principal and thereby to terminate the trust in one year, any capital gains realized
during that year would form part of DNI as it always
does in the year of termination (as the capital gain
would be “actually distributed to the beneficiary”
within the meaning of reg. section 1.643(a)-3(b)). That
is confirmed by Example 7, which is the same as Example (4) in the prior regulations. Hence, the statement
probably should be interpreted to mean that the trustee
cannot exercise the discretion to deem discretionary
distributions as consisting of capital gain (although the
capital gain may be in DNI for other reasons).
Example 2 is the same as Example 1 except it is
stated that the trustee intends to follow a regular practice of treating discretionary distributions of corpus as
consisting first of net realized capital gains for the year,
evidencing that treatment by including the realized
gain in DNI on the trust’s federal income tax return.
(It is not mentioned if the trustee also notes that allocation on the trust’s books and records.) Example 2 states
that the trustee is given two discretionary powers: one
to invade principal and the other to deem discretionary
distributions as being made from capital gains. The
example states that “[t]his treatment of the capital
gains is a reasonable exercise of [the t]rustee’s discretion.” It is interesting that the example seems to assume
that “deeming” the discretionary distribution as being
made from capital gains falls under the regulatory language of reg. section 1.643(a)-3(b) that the gain has
been allocated to corpus and is treated consistently by
t he fiduciary a s p art of the distribu tion to the
beneficiary. But that seems to be the only conclusion
that can be reached. The example goes on to provide
that in future years the trustee must treat all discretionary distributions as being made first from realized capital gains. Although not stated, it seems that it must be
from gains realized that year and not from a prior year.
Hence, gains from a prior year and not previously
deemed distributed may not be treated as funding the
discretionary distribution until all gains realized from
the year the discretionary distribution is made are allocated to DNI. (An allocation of a prior year’s capital
gain to the distribution seems to have no practical tax
effect because DNI consists only of taxable income of
the current year.)39 The example indicates that if the

39
At one time, the allocation of capital gain to DNI that was
not distributed could have a tax effect under the old “throwback rules.” See subpart D of part 1 of subchapter J as in effect
from 1970 to 1986.
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trustee fails to treat discretionary distributions as being
paid first from any net capital gains realized by the
trust during a later year, those gains nonetheless will
be allocated to DNI. The example involves “net” capital
gain, presumably meaning it is the realized capital gain
as offset by capital losses for the year (or prior loss
carryover).
Example 3 is the same as Example 2 except that the
trustee intends to follow a regular practice of treating
discretionary distributions of corpus as being paid
from any net capital gains realized by the trust during
the year from the sale of specified assets or a particular
class of investments. The example states that this is also
a reasonable exercise of the trustee’s discretion, even
though there does not seem to be any express authorization in the governing instrument to do so — on the
other hand, it does not seem that action is prohibited.
This example seems to permit the trustee to decide on
an asset-by-asset basis whether realized capital gain
allocable to corpus should be included in DNI. The
only apparent constraint imposed by the example is
that a trustee elects to treat gain from any particular
investment or class of investment to be included or
excluded from DNI.40 The same treatment may be required in a future sale or exchange of the same investment. So, for example, if the trustee has invested in
Stocks A and B, the trustee may decide to include realized gain on the sale of stock A as part of a discretionary distribution of corpus (and thereby cause it to be
part of DNI) but exclude the gain realized on the sale
of Stock B. If the trustee were to sell less than all of the
Stock A, the trustee may be required to treat the allocation of gain from sale of all or part of the balance of
Stock A to DNI. On the other hand, nothing in the
example suggests that the trustee cannot treat different
blocks of the same asset differently. For instance, the
trustee purchases 100 shares of Stock A in 2004 and 50
more shares in 2005. In 2006 the trustee sells the block
of 50 shares purchased in 2005, distributes the proceeds
of sales, and “deems” the capital gain to be part of that
distribution. It may well be that the trustee may choose
not to “deem” any gain realized on the sale of the block
purchased in 2004 as part of a distribution of the
proceeds. In requiring asset-by-asset or class-by-class
specification, the regulations fail to indicate the time
and manner in doing so.41 For example, if the regulations intended a trustee to specify the treatment of any
gain realized on the sale of an asset at the time of its
acquisition by the trustee as opposed to the time of its
sale, they should have specified how that “election”

40
Technically, the trustee does not elect for some capital
gains to be in DNI. Rather, the trustee “deems” gains to be
part of a discretionary distribution of corpus and that makes
the gains part of DNI.
41
In any case, perhaps, this means that trustee, if authorized under the instrument or local law, could deem discretionary distributions as consisting only of capital gains realized on the sale of assets to the extent the overall value of
the trust exceeds its original value. That type of treatment is
nearly, although not exactly, compelled by the new final regu l at i o n s , di s cu s s e d b el o w, c o n ce r ni n g i n co m e -o n l y
charitable-remainder trusts.

901

(C) Tax Analysts 2004. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

should have been manifested. Hence, a reasonable conclusion is that the trustee need only manifest the intention at the time of sale. If the specification need not be
made until the year of sale, the trustee has much
latitude on deciding year by year whether capital gain
from any investment or class of investment is to be
included in any discretionary distribution of corpus
and, therefore, in DNI. That latitude may not have been
intended given the regulations’ emphasis on the “consistency” requirement.
Example 4 also is the same as Example 1 except that
under the terms of the governing instrument (in a provision not prohibited by local law), capital gains are
allocated to income. The example concludes that those
gains, accordingly, do form part of DNI. As discussed
above, this example is inconsistent with the basic rule
of the regulations that to allocate capital gain to FAI to
include it in DNI the allocation must be pursuant to
both local law and the governing instrument.
Example 5 is also the same as Example 1, except that
the trustee decides that discretionary distributions of
corpus will be made only to the extent the trust has
realized capital gains during the year. The example
concludes that the capital gain is included in the trust’s
DNI for the year because the trustee “will use the
amount of any realized capital gain to determine the
am ount of th e discretion ary distribution to the
beneficiary.” It seems, although it is not certain, that
the trustee is not being compelled to distribute in future years each year ’s realized capital gains. Rather, it
seems that because the trustee has decided that distributions — if made at all — will be made only to the
extent of realized capital gains, DNI includes gains in
years in which the amount of discretionary distributions are made because the trustee has committed to
limit such distributions by the amount of the gains.42
It is uncertain whether a proportionate part of capital
gains would be included in DNI if the trustee had
determined to limit discretionary distributions to a
fractional portion or perhaps a dollar amount of realized capital gains during the year. In that case also, the
capital gains allocated to corpus would be “utilized by
the fiduciary in determining the amount that is distributed” within the meaning of reg. section 1.643(a)3(b). There is, as stated, an indication that the trustee
could decide year by year whether to make any discretionary distribution, and as long as the trustee determines that amount of the year’s discretionary distribution by the amount of realized capital gain, that gain
will be included in DNI.
Example 6 involves a trust that requires that a
specific asset be sold after 10 years and the sales
proceeds be distributed to the income beneficiary. The
example concludes that any gain realized on that sale
42
The example does not specify what occurs if the trustee
later changes the discretionary distribution pattern by distributing, in a particular year, more than realized gain. Moreover,
without express authority to so limit distributions in the future,
it seems the trustee would be violating the trustee’s fiduciary
duty and any attempt to so limit distributions would be void
or voidable under local law; if so, it seems questionable whether
the decision would be respected for tax purposes.
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is included in DNI because the trustee “uses the
amount of the sales proceeds that includes any realized
capital gain to determine the amount required to be
distributed” to the beneficiary. This example is the
same as Example (3) of the prior regulations, except
new Example 6 adds reasoning for its conclusion —
that is, the capital gains are part of DNI because the
trustee uses the amount of sales proceeds to determine
t h e a m ou n t re qu i re d t o b e di s tr ib u t ed t o th e
beneficiary. Old Example (3) contains no explanation,
just the facts and the conclusion that the realized gains
are part of DNI for the year of sale and distribution. It
seems that the reasoning used in the example may not
be correct. It appears that the reason that the DNI includes the gains from the sale is not because the trustee
uses the amount of sales proceeds to determine the
amount required to be distributed, but because the gain
is “actually distributed to the beneficiary” within the
meaning of reg. section 1.643(a)-3(b). Moreover, even
the reasoning expressed in Example 6 seems at odds
with the regulation. The regulation does not say that
the gain is included in DNI when the proceeds that may
include the capital gains are used to determine “the
amount that is . . . required to be distributed to a
beneficiary.” Rather the regulation says the gain is in
DNI when the “[g]ains . . . are . . . [a]llocated to corpus
but . . . utilized by the fiduciary in determining the
amount that is . . . required to be distributed to the
beneficiary.” (Emphasis added.) In any case, Example
6 appears to expand this regulatory rule when the
proceeds (including the gains) are allocated to corpus
and the proceeds are used to determine the amount
that is required to be distributed to the beneficiary.
Example 7 is the same in its facts and conclusion as
Example (4) of the prior regulations. In the example,
when the beneficiary reaches age 35, the trust is to
terminate. It is concluded that in that year all capital
gains are included in DNI. Unlike old Example (4), new
Example 7 provides reasoning for its conclusion: All
capital gains are included in DNI because all trust
assets, including all gains, are actually distributed to
the beneficiary.
Example 8 is the same as Example 7 except the trustee
must first distribute $10,000 to another beneficiary before
distributing the balance of the trust assets to its income
beneficiary. The example concludes that none of the DNI
(which includes the gains realized in the year of termination) is allocated to the distribution to the beneficiary who
receives the $10,000 because that distribution is in satisfaction of a specific sum of money, which under section
663(a)(1) cannot, in general, be deemed to consist of DNI.
The example does not deal with a possible exception
when the $10,000 must be satisfied in whole or in part
with capital gain because the trust has insufficient other
corpus to satisfy it.43

43
For example, in the year of termination the trust incurs
$100,000 capital gain and the value of the whole trust is
$105,000. $10,000 will be distributed to the beneficiary who is
entitled to that amount and $95,000 is to be distributed to the
remainder beneficiary. Clearly, the $10,000 bequest would be

(Footnote 43 continued on next page.)
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Example 9 also is the same as Example 7 except that
one-half of the principal is to be distributed to the
beneficiary when attaining age 35. To satisfy that
obligation, the trustee sells one-half of the trust’s assets
— at a gain — when the beneficiary reaches age 35 and
distributes the sale proceeds to the beneficiary. The
example concludes that the capital gains realized on
th at sale are in cluded in DNI because all sales
proceeds, including all the capital gain attributable to
the sale, are actually distributed to the beneficiary.
Example 10 is the same as Example 9 except the
trustee sells all the assets at a gain. The example states
that if authorized by the governing instrument and the
applicable state statute,44 the trustee may determine to
what extent that capital gain is distributed to the
beneficiary, although the distribution must include at
least the minimum amount of capital gain that in fact
would be distributed and must include no more than
the lesser of the distribution or the capital gains realized by the sale. The example indicates that the trustee
evidences the amount of capital gains the trustee determines (subject to the minimum and maximum stated
above) to include in the distribution to the beneficiary
by including that amount in DNI on the trust’s federal
income tax return. The example says that if the trustee
is not authorized by the governing instrument and the
applicable state statutes to make that allocation, then
one-half of the capital gain attributable to the sale is
included in DNI for the year of sale. As indicated
above, it is uncertain what authority must be granted
under the applicable state statutes so that the trustee
can allocate the DNI in accordance with this example.
If state law provides that the governing instrument
controls all distribution matters, then express authorization under the governing instrument should be sufficient. If the state statutes must expressly authorize a
trustee to make that allocation, then it seems that the
ability to use the flexibility provided in Example 10
will be limited as few, if any, state statutes provide that
explicit authority to trustees. Thus, it seems that a state
statute providing that the governing instrument may
allocate receipts (as opposed to capital gains) between
beneficiaries as directed by the trustee should be sufficient under the example. A critical point, however, is
that if the trustee is given the authority under the state
statute and the governing instrument, the trustee may
determine how much is “actually distributed to the
funded with at least $5,000 of capital gain. It is unclear what
the result would be. If the beneficiary of the $10,000 bequest
does not have to include any portion of the capital gain (DNI)
into income, and the remainder beneficiary must include only
$95,000 in gross income (because that is all the beneficiary
receives), then it seems that the trust is subject to tax on $5,000
of capital gain (perhaps reduced by the personal exemption). If
the trustee must pay tax on the $5,000 capital gain, the
remainder beneficiary will receive less than $95,000 so even
more than $5,000 will be taxed to the trust. Alternatively, the
beneficiary entitled to the $10,000 gift must include $5,000 of
the capital gain in income.
44
Under the general rules of reg. section 1.663(a)-3(b), the
discretion of the trustee to allocate gain to corpus and be
included in DNI must be either pursuant to a direction in both
a state statute and the governing instrument or an authorization under either.
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beneficiary” under reg. section 1.643(a)-3(c)(3). The only
limitations seem to be that the trustee will be treated as
at least allocating the minimum amount of gain the trustee must use in satisfying the bequest, and the trustee
cannot be treated as allocating more than the maximum
amount of gain the trustee could use in satisfying the
bequest the trustee may allocate any amount between
those two amounts. Finally, it seems odd that the trustee
can exercise this discretion only if authorized by state
statute and the governing instrument — in other words,
why would not an impartial and reasonable exercise of
discretion granted under either a state statute or the
governing instrument be sufficient?
Example 11 involves a state statute that permits the
trustee to elect to pay the income beneficiary a 4 percent unitrust amount in lieu of income. The state
statute provides that the unitrust amount shall be considered paid first from ordinary and tax-exempt income (both of which are automatically part of DNI
under section 643(a)), then net short-term capital gain,
then net long-term capital gain, and then corpus. The
govern in g instrument provides that th e income
beneficiary is to receive income as defined under the
state statute. The trustee elects to pay the unitrust
amount to the income beneficiary. The value of the trust
is $500,000, so the trustee distributes $20,000 (that is, 4
percent of $500,000) to the beneficiary in satisfaction of
the unitrust amount. In that year the trust has $5,000
of dividend income and $80,000 of net long-term capital gain. The example states — which seems correct as
far as the state statute is concerned — that $15,000 of
the gain is allocated to income pursuant to the “ordering” rule of the state statute and therefore concludes
that the $15,000 of gain is included in DNI. The example suggests that allocation of gain to income under
state law is sufficient to cause it to be in DNI even if
the instrument does not so specifically direct. That
seems contrary to the basic rule set forth in reg. section
1.643(a)-3(b) about when capital gain allocated to
fiduciary accounting income will be considered to form
part of DNI.45 Indeed, the example supports the notion
that allocation of capital gain to income simply under
the terms of the governing instrument is sufficient to
make it part of DNI, assuming state law does not prohibit that result. In any case, as discussed below, Example 12 implies that the result in Example 11 would
be the same if the governing instrument (rather than a
state statute) provided the “tax character” ordering
rule that is deemed to make up any unitrust payment.46
45
Example 4 and Example 11 seem to suggest that the conjunctive requirement that capital gains can be part of DNI by
an allocation pursuant to both the governing instrument and
local law is really a disjunctive one: Capital gains will be in
DNI when it is allocated to FAI either by the governing instrument (if not prohibited by state law) or by state law.
46
As discussed elsewhere, the Treasury rejected the suggestion that a trust should be treated as paying its income
for tax purposes if the governing instrument provided for
the payment of a unitrust amount rather than having it provide for the payment of income and having the trustee elect
to pay a unitrust amount pursuant to an authorization under
a state statute (or perhaps under state case law that correctly
reflects the state’s common law of trusts).
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Few if any state statutes contain an explicit “tax character” ordering rule set forth in Example 11.47 Thus, it
would be prudent to address the issue in any governing instrument when it is anticipated that a conversion
to a unitrust may occur. In fact, as will be discussed
below, to maximize planning potential of whether to
have gain taxes to the trust or to the beneficiary, it
probably will be appropriate to authorize the trustee
t o de t e rm in e , i n t h e e xe rc is e o f i mp a rt i al a n d
reasonable discretion and in accordance with Example
12 discussed below, the tax character of unitrust payments.
Example 12 is the same as Example 11 except that
neither the governing instrument nor a state statute
provides an ordering rule for the tax character of the
unitrust payment. Although the example does not say
whether the authority comes from the governing instrument, a state statute or both, it provides that the
decision on determining the tax character is left to the
discretion of the trustee. The example states that the
trustee intends to follow a regular practice of treating
the unitrust amount as comprising corpus rather than
capital gain to the extent the unitrust amount exceeds
the trust’s ordinary and tax-exempt income (both of
which will automatically form part of DNI). The example states that the trustee will manifest the ordering
rule decision by not including any capital gain in the
DNI, which would be reflected on the trust’s federal
income tax return including the Form K-1 sent to the
beneficiary. The example concludes that that treatment
of not having the capital gains form part of DNI is a
reasonable exercise of the trustee’s discretion, but in
future years the trustee must not allocate capital gains
to income — implying, perhaps, that any attempt to do
otherwise will be void as a matter of federal tax law.
Example 13 is the same as Example 12 except the
trustee intends to follow a regular practice of treating
the unitrust amount as comprising of capital gain to
the extent the unitrust amount exceeds the trust’s ordinary and tax-exempt income. The example concludes
that that treatment of having the capital gains form part
of DNI is a reasonable exercise of the trustee’s discretion but in future years the trustee must treat capital
gain, if any, as distributed to the beneficiary to the
extent the unitrust amount exceeds the trust’s ordinary
and tax-exempt income.

47
It is possible that some states at least indirectly have such
a rule. For instance, some states direct that the unitrust
amount be satisfied using net fiduciary accounting income to
the extent thereof and then from corpus. Under applicable
state law, that net income may include some classes of tax
income (such as interest and dividends) as opposed to others
(such as realized gains). Hence, it may be that those states will
be determined to provide at least a limited tax-character rule.
However, it seems likely that the unitrust payment will be
deemed to consist of DNI regardless of a state-mandated taxcharacter ordering rule except to the extent the rule deals with
realized capital gain to put it in or keep it out of DNI. In other
words, it seems likely that a tax-character ordering rule in
funding a unitrust payment will control only if DNI includes
capital gain to the extent the unitrust payment exceeds DNI
as it is determined without regard to capital gains.
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Example 14 in essence combines Examples 12 and
13. In Example 14 a corporate fiduciary, acting under
governing instruments and state statutes that do not
provide a tax-character ordering rule for unitrust payments but leave the decision to the trustee, intends to
consistently treat the unitrust amount as consisting of
capital gain to the extent the unitrust amount exceeds
the trust’s ordinary and tax-exempt income for some
trusts and treats the unitrust amount as consisting of
corpus, and not capital gain, to the extent the unitrust
amount exceeds ordinary and tax-exempt income for
other trusts. The example concludes that the trustee’s
decision regarding each trust is a reasonable exercise
of the trustee’s discretion, but that in future years the
trustee must treat the capital gains consistently with
the treatment in the prior years. This example is important to those who serve as trustee of several trusts.
However, trustees probably should make sure that they
can justify to their beneficiaries (and the local courts)
why the trustee decided to include capital gain as part
of the unitrust payment in one trust but not another.
The regulations do not specify the consequences of
the trustee not exercising the discretion consistently
when consistency in allocation is required. It seems
that the likely consequence will be that the prior treatment will apply in the future for tax purposes even if
the trustee does not exercise the discretion consistently.
In other words, as indicated, the trustee probably
would be viewed as having made an irrevocable election. For instance, a trustee decides to have the unitrust
payments deemed to consist of realized capital gain to
the extent the payments exceed the trust’s ordinary and
tax-exempt income and follows that practice, manifesting it by that treatment on the trust’s federal income
tax returns, consistently for years.48 A new trustee is
appointed who decides not to follow the treatment of
the prior trustee. It seems that the regulations will
cause capital gain to be treated as part of DNI to the
extent the prior trustee so treated it. Nevertheless, the
regulations do not specify what occurs if the trustee
does not intend to consistently treat the make-up of a
unitrust payment as including capital gain. For
instance, in the first year, the trustee decides not to
have any part of the unitrust amount consist of capital
gain but does not intend to regularly follow that practice. In other words, the trustee intends to decide year
by year whether it is preferable to have capital gain
form part of the unitrust payment. When, unlike Ex-

48
While the definition-of-income regulation clearly provides that the use of a unitrust will not harm the validity of
the trust for marital deduction or similar purposes if state law
authorizes it, the DNI regulation is not as unequivocal. In a
unitrust, the DNI regulation provides that capital gain can be
included in DNI when there is authorizing legislation and the
trustee makes the allocation consistently. See reg. section
1.643(a)-3(b)(1). Although not entirely clear, that would appear to suggest that, absent a statute, gain may not be included
in DNI in an instrument-authorized unitrust. Thus, even assuming the instrument directed that the unitrust payment
consist of capital gain to the extent that the payment exceeds
the trust’s other income, the regulation implies that the gain
may not be included in DNI in the absence of a statute.
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ample 11, state law does not mandate the tax character
make-up of the unitrust amount, but leaves the
decision to the fiduciary, it is unclear what the result
would be. However, it seems that the trustee will be
treated as having made an irrevocable election on behalf of the trust that is binding for all future years even
if the trustee did not intend to allocate or not allocate
capital gain to the unitrust payments consistently.49
The regulations obviously assume that the trustee
would have the authority under state law or the instrument to make such a binding election. If a state court
were to hold that the election constituted an abuse of
discretion, it is uncertain how the IRS would respond.
The regulations provide no answer as to how much
capital gain will be included in DNI when neither state
law nor the governing instrument mandates the tax
character of unitrust distributions and the trustee is not
otherwise given the discretion to specify the character.
Example (2) of the prior regulations may provide an
answer. In that example the trustee was required to pay
the beneficiary an annuity of $15,000 each year. The
example appears to conclude that even though the trustee is required to sell an asset at a profit of $10,000 to
pay the annuity amount, no portion of the capital gain
is included in DNI. The example might have supported
the conclusion that a unitrust amount will not be
deemed to consist of capital gain unless a state statute
(or possibly the governing instrument) provides otherwise or the trustee is authorized to determine the extent
to which it will be deemed to consist of the gain and
does so. But as indicated, old Example (2) has been
eliminated, and what that means is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, state courts may well conclude
that the trustee has been given tax-character ordering
discretion either under state law or implicitly by the
governing instrument.
5. Power to adjust and capital gain. As indicated
above, one of the driving forces behind the new regulations was the adoption by many states of a law granting an equitable adjustment power to trustees who
invest under the Prudent Investor Act. Under that
power, the trustee, to fulfill the fiduciary obligation of
impartiality to both current and successor beneficiaries, may allocate corpus to income or income to
corpus. Nowhere in the Uniform Act is a trustee specifically authorized to allocate any particular type of corpus to income or any particular type of income to
corpus. For example, nothing in the act specifies
whether the trustee may allocate proceeds of sale that
would otherwise be allocated to corpus to income. Nor
does the act specifically provide that the trustee may
allocate to income capital gain that would otherwise
be allocated to corpus. The act does not prohibit those
allocations; it just does not address them. Perhaps that
should not be surprising. After all, the Uniform Act

49
It seems odd that the regulations fail to create a mechanism by which the IRS, in its discretion, could relieve the trust
of an election regarding later years. It may be that the drafters
of the regulations did not fully appreciate that the consistency
requirement constitutes an irrevocable election as a practical
matter.
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was to serve as a model state law under which trustees
could more efficiently carry out their duties; it is not a
tax statute, so it is not surprising that it does not deal
with tax concepts per se. The Uniform Act does, however, direct the trustee, in deciding whether and how
to exercise a power to adjust, to consider tax consequences. Thus, it probably would be appropriate, if not
obligatory, for a trustee, in determining how much corpus should be converted to income pursuant to the
power to adjust, to consider whether or how the powerto-adjust payment would be subject to tax. But a power
to convert corpus to income is not an authorization to
allocate realized capital gain that otherwise would
form part of corpus to income — at least, it is not a
direct authorization to do so. That is not surprising
inasmuch as the Uniform Act was drafted before the
new regulations were even proposed and therefore
without any awareness that the regulations would permit a trustee to control whether realized capital gain
would form part of DNI through the allocation of the
gain to income. Hence, it is uncertain, at best, whether
an equitable adjustment power will be viewed as
authorizing a trustee to allocate realized capital gain
to income.
It seems as though the regulations view the power
to allocate capital gain to income as a power distinct
from a power to adjust. In the definition-of-income
regulations (which contain nearly the same provision
about allocating gain to FAI as do the new DNI regulations), the allocation to income of all or a part of gains
from the sale or exchange of trust assets appears to be
described as a separate power from the power to adjust: The sentence that deals with allocation of gain to
income follows closely (and is in the same paragraph
of) the discussion of the power to adjust and begins
with “In addition,” suggesting that the drafters of the
regulations viewed the power to allocate capital gain
to income as a distinct power. Also, as mentioned
above, a power to adjust will be respected, according
to the regulations, only if granted by local law (the
regulations indicating that an equitable adjustment
power will not be respected for tax purposes if conferred solely by the governing instrument). Yet the discretionary power to allocate gain to income will be
respected for tax purposes, according to the definitionof-income regulations, if granted under either local law
or the governing instrument.
The definition-of-income regulation seems to have
a bias toward income. First, it clearly permits the allocation of capital gain to income (if pursuant to
reasonably and impartially exercised power of allocation) but not in the opposite direction. Capital gain
allocated to corpus will generally be respected when
that allocation would traditionally occur. Second, capital gain can be freely allocated to income even though
that allocation is inconsistent with traditional rules,
provided t he allocat ion occurs pursu ant to the
reasonable and impartial exercise of discretion. The
regulations, however, do not address whether capital
gain that, under traditional notions, is allocable to income can be allocated by the trustee under a discretionary power to corpus. For example, in an underproductive property statute, a portion of proceeds of
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sale and, therefore, a portion of realized capital gain is
allocated to income as a traditional matter.50 If, however, the trustee were to allocate, under a discretionary
power, all of the proceeds (and the gain) to corpus, the
definition-of-income regulation would appear not to
respect that allocation.51 It sets forth as a general rule
the requirement that only allocations that are consistent with traditional state law rules will be respected.
It then creates three exceptions to that general rule. The
first deals with a unitrust, as discussed above. The
second deals with an equitable adjustment power. The
third deals with a discretionary allocation of capital
gain to income. Neither the general (traditional) rule
nor any of the exceptions contemplates that an allocation of capital gain to corpus will be respected when,
under traditional principles, it would be allocated to
income.
It will be noted that none of the examples under the
capital-gain-in-DNI regulations seems to deal with
having capital gain form part of DNI through the exercise of a power to adjust. It seems certain that the
drafters of the regulations contemplated that capital
gain could be part of DNI by reason of a power to
adjust. The preamble acknowledges that commentators
requested examples of how that would occur. The request was rejected on the grounds that state variations
of the power of adjustment were too great so as to make
additional examples difficult and perhaps unhelpful.
Even though, as indicated, the definition-of-income
regulation provides that the exercise of an equitable
adjustment power would be respected for tax purposes
and, when read against the backdrop of the preamble,
implies that capital gain could as a result be included
in DNI, the DNI regulation fails to explain the method
by which this might occur. The DNI regulation does
provide that capital gain will be included in DNI when
the gain is allocated to income in the trustee’s discretion.52 And the definition-of-income regulation confirms that the discretionary allocation of realized capital gain to income does not violate the traditional
income-and-principal requirement. Given, however,
that under state law, the exercise of an equitable adjustment power does not appear to permit realized gain
to be allocated to income (but only permits corpus to
be converted to income), it remains unclear whether a
trustee operating under a state statute that confers an
equitable adjustment power will be permitted to use

50

See Rev. Rul. 85-116, supra note 27.
There may be an explanation for this latter distinction
between the two sets of regulations. Like the prior regulations, the new definition-of-income regulation seems to
reflect a concern about allocating income to corpus rather
than the reverse. Presumably, the drafters were concerned
about inadvertently undermining other provisions in the
code mandating that income be paid on a current basis (for
example, the QTIP provision or the QSST). Se e section
2056(b)(7); section 1361.
52
See reg. section 1.643(a)-3(b).
51
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the power to allocate realized capital gain to income
and thereby cause it to be included in DNI.53
Perhaps the drafters of the regulations did not appreciate the subtle difference between the authority to
allocate realized gain to income, on one hand, and the
authority to convert corpus to income, on the other. Or
perhaps they had the impression that an equitable adjustment power is analogous to the power to allocate
receipts between principal and income, which was the
focus of TAM 8728001.54 In the TAM the instrument
gave the trustee the discretionary authority to allocate
receipts between income and principal. The Service concluded that the amount of realized capital gain that the
trustee had allocated to income was properly included
in DNI. While it is understandable that the drafters
might have perceived the power at issue in the TAM
to be parallel to an equitable adjustment power and
that the TAM therefore became a template for the regulations, they may not be equivalent. For example, a
trustee is permitted to make an equitable adjustment
under the Uniform Act even when no sale has occurred
and capital gain has therefore not been realized,
whereas the power to allocate receipts attributable to
the sale of an asset could be exercised only if a sale is
made.
Even assuming that one were to conclude that a
trustee with an equitable adjustment power has the
same power as in the TAM, computational questions
would still remain. Is the trustee, in other words, permitted to decide the portion of realized gain to be
included in income? Or is the trustee required to allocate a portion of the amount realized (that is, a portion
of the sales proceeds) to income, with the portion of
the gain so allocated to be determined on a pro rata
basis? To illustrate, assume that the trustee has a basis
of $40 in the asset and sells it for $100. If the trustee
used the equitable adjustment power and converted

53
Prof. Ascher argues that under the regulations the conversion of corpus to income under an equitable adjustment
power will unquestionably cause realized gain to be included
in DNI. In his view, the regulations leave no outstanding
questions concerning the tax effect of equitable adjustment.
While the preamble to the regulations certainly suggest that
the drafters envisioned that an equitable adjustment could
cause capital gain to be included in DNI, the text of the regulations unfortunately fail to confirm that suggestion and also
fail to indicate how it might mechanically occur. In the absence
of further guidance, in our view, trustees and beneficiaries
will be uncertain about when the use of an equitable adjustment power will cause realized gain to be included in DNI.
Moreover, as discussed, even assuming it does cause gain to
be included in DNI, important computational questions
remain.
54
One can infer from reg. section 1.642(c)-2(c) and 1.642(c)5, which deal with the set-aside deduction for a pooled income fund, that the drafters were uncertain about the
mechanics of equitable adjustment under state law. In the
regulations, they appear to anticipate that the adjustment
might be made in one of two ways: (i) when the trustee takes
into account unrealized appreciation in deciding how much
to distribute to the income beneficiary; or (ii) when the trustee allocates some or all of the sales proceeds to the income
beneficiary.
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$20 of corpus to income, would that cause $20 of the
$60 gain to be included in income and DNI? Or would
it cause none of the gain to be so included on the
rationale that in effect the trustee allocated a portion
of the $40 basis to income or on the rationale that the
conversion of corpus to income does not bear a sufficient relationship to the sale or the gain? Or would it
cause, as perhaps another alternative, a pro rata 20
percent of the gain to be included in income and DNI
on the rationale that 20 percent of the proceeds were
allocated to income (causing, in other words, $12 of the
gain, which is 20 percent of the total gain, to be included in income and DNI)?
Although the TAM does not address the computational question, it does imply that on these facts, a
trustee having discretionary authority to allocate
receipts between income and principal could choose to
allocate $20 of the sales proceeds to income and thereby
cause $20 of the gain to be included in DNI. That implication in the TAM is inconsistent, however, with the
approach the Service took in Rev. Rul. 85-116. In the
revenue ruling, the trustee was required by an underproductive property statute to allocate a portion of the
sales proceeds to income. The Service concluded that
a pro rata portion of the trust’s gain should be included
in income and DNI. If, using the hypothesized facts,
20 percent of the sales proceeds were allocated to income under the statute, 20 percent of the gain, or $12
of gain, would be included in income and DNI. While
the revenue ruling’s pro rata approach would appear
to be inconsistent with the TAM, the TAM does not
acknowledge that or even cite the ruling. However, the
Service is obliged to follow its published guidance.55
And because it has not revoked the ruling, one might
assume that it will require trustees making an equitable
adjustment to use the pro rata method — if it ultimately
concludes that the conversion of corpus to income
under an exercise of the power constitutes an allocation
of gain to income so as to permit it to be included in
income and DNI.
On the other hand, in three different contexts, the
regulations appear not to require the use of the revenue
ruling’s pro rata approach, opting instead for the
method that the TAM implies is correct. The first context is when a trustee makes a discretionary distribution of principal and commits to a consistent exercise
of the authority to deem distributions to consist of
capital gain. Examples 2 and 5 (reg. section 1.643(a)3(e)) conclude that the amount of realized gain deemed
by the trustee as distributed is included in DNI. The
second context is when the trustee is administering a
unitrust. If the trustee is directed under a so-called
ordering rule to treat the beneficiary as having received
“net capital gain” to the extent that the sum of ordinary
and tax-exempt income is less than the unitrust amount
(or if the trustee has ordering discretion and commits
to a consistent pattern), the gain will be included in

55
See Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157, Doc 200222803, 2002 TNT 195-13 (2002); Baker v. Commissioner, 122 T.C.
No. 8, Doc 2004-3555, 2004 TNT 34-9 (2004).
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DNI. See Examples 11, 12, and 13. The third context is
when the trustee is given the discretion to allocate
realized gain to income. If the trustee reasonably and
impartially exercises that discretion, the portion of gain
allocated to income will be included in DNI. And unlike the first two contexts, there is no requirement that
the trustee commit to a consistent pattern, permitting
the trustee to decide on a yearly basis how much capital
gain to allocate to income. While that strongly implies
a rejection of the pro rata approach in this context as
well, the regulation fails to provide any examples illustrating the computation of DNI when the trustee
invokes this discretion.
In sum, given the rejection of the revenue ruling’s
pro rata method in the first two contexts and its tacit
rejection in the third, together with the regulation’s
failure to embrace or even mention the pro rata method
in any context, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that
the Service might eventually revoke the ruling — or
perhaps limit its application to allocations made under
an underproductive property statute. Or the Service
could conceivably clarify that the pro rata method does
not apply in the case of an equitable adjustment. Or,
as yet another alternative, it might extend the rationale
of Examples 2 and 5, in which the trustee had the
authority to deem a distribution of corpus as consisting
of capital gain, and thereby permit a trustee to deem a
distribution made under an equitable adjustment
power as consisting of capital gain — though that
would presumably trigger the requirement that the
trustee commit to a consistent pattern. In the meantime, however, the Service’s reticence about the effects
of an equitable adjustment leaves taxpayers without
clear guidance.

VII. Capital Gains and Charity
A. Pooled Income Funds
A decedent’s estate, a pre-1970 trust, and a pooled
income fund defined in section 642(c)(5) may be permitted a current income tax deduction for gross income
set aside for charitable purposes under the terms of the
governing instrument — even if the income will not be
paid for the charitable purpose until a later tax year.
Section 642(c). (Both estates and trusts are entitled to
a current income tax deduction for gross income currently paid to charity under the terms of the governing
instrument. Id.)
Reg. section 1.642(c)-2(c), which deals with the setaside charitable deduction for pooled income funds, is
revised by the final regulations. A pooled income fund
is a trust or other fund that is maintained by a
charitable organization (such as a college) that is the
trustee and the remainder beneficiary, receives contributions from individuals, and provides for one or more
individuals to receive the income for life. A pooled
income fund is not exempt from income taxation but
is permitted a current income tax deduction for longterm capital gain set aside for a charitable purpose (that
is, is allocated to corpus and not to income).
New reg. section 1.642(c)-2(c) provides that no net
long-term capital gain is considered permanently set
aside for charitable purposes if, under the terms of the
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governing instrument and applicable local law,56 the trustee has the power (whether or not it is exercised) to satisfy
a beneficiary’s right to income by the payment of either
a unitrust amount or any other amount that takes into
account unrealized appreciation in the fund’s assets.57
The regulation goes on to provide that: “no amount of
net long-term capital gain shall be considered permanently set aside for charitable purposes to the extent the trustee distributes proceeds from the sale or exchange of the
fund’s assets as income . . . .” While the former prohibition clearly requires that the trustee be denied the
authority to use a unitrust regime or to take into account
unrealized appreciation, the latter provision appears to
focus on how the trustee administers the trust. In other
words, even if the trustee has the authority to allocate
proceeds from an actual sale to income, it would appear
that the set-aside deduction will be permitted if no such
allocation is made. The use of that operational test in turn
raises questions: whether a distribution of sales proceeds
to the income beneficiary in one year will lead to a denial
of the set-aside deduction in another year; or whether the
distribution to the income beneficiary of sales proceeds
from an asset generating short-term capital gain will
preclude a deduction for the set-aside of long-term capital
gain attributable to other assets. The apparent purpose
for these prohibitions is to prevent funds for which the
pooled income fund receives an income tax charitable
deduction (limited, as indicated, to its long-term capital
gain) from being subsequently distributed to an individual income beneficiary. Given that purpose, it is
surprising that, after requiring a prohibition on the
trustee’s authority in a unitrust conversion or an allocation based on unrealized appreciation, the drafters went
on to adopt the less stringent operational test for actual
sales.
Most pooled income funds will not contain the
necessary prohibitions, although presumably state
statutes do or will contain a saving provision.58 Thus,
56
This suggests that if the payments are made only under
state law or only under the governing instrument, the denial
of the set-aside deduction does not apply. That result, however, seems untenable.
57
Although it seems likely that the reference to a payment
of “any amount that takes into account unrealized appreciation” means a power to adjust, the reference is incomplete.
As mentioned above, a power to adjust need not take into
account unrealized appreciation but may be made when
there is no appreciation; similarly, it may take into account
realized appreciation from a prior tax year.
58
New York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) 112.3(b)(5)(C)(iv) prohibits a fiduciary from exercising a “power
to adjust” from any amount that is permanently set aside for
charitable purposes unless the income therefrom is also permanently devoted to charitable purposes. Thus, in a pooled
income fund governed by New York law, any long-term capital
gain set aside for the charity cannot subsequently be the source
of an equitable adjustment (given that the income beneficiary
is not a charity). As a result, the regulations would permit the
use of a set-aside deduction in the case of a New York fund. In
addition, EPTL 11-2.4(c)(9) provides in effect that a trust may
not convert to a unitrust regime if “pursuant to its terms . . .
any amount is permanently aside for charitable purposes unless the income therefrom is also permanently devoted to
charitable purposes.”
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depending on state law, it may be necessary to amend
or reform the governing instrument to eliminate the
possibility of converting to a unitrust or the possibility
of making an equitable adjustment (provided payments have not already been determined under a
unitrust regime or on the basis of an equitable adjustment).59 A judicial reformation proceeding must be
commenced no later than October 2, 2004, or, if later,
nine months after the effective date of a state statute
authorizing a unitrust conversion or the use of an equitable adjustment power.60 Moreover, when drafting
new instruments, it might be prudent to direct the trustee to comply with the operational test.
In addition to denying the income tax charitable
deduction for long-term capital gain realized by a
pooled income fund, in some cases, as set forth above,
the new regulations change the definition of “income”
for purposes of a pooled income fund. Presumably, for
a trust to become or remain a pooled income fund, the
new regulatory requirement must be satisfied. Before
the amendment, reg. section 1.642(c)-5(a)(5)(i) provided that the “term ‘income’ has the same meaning
as it does under section 643(b) and the regulations
thereunder.” Now that the final regulations have
changed the meaning of income for purposes of that
section, the meaning of income is changed by the new
final regulations for purposes of pooled income funds.
New reg. section 1.642(c)-5(a)(5)(i) provides that although the meaning of income generally has the same
meaning as under section 643(b) and its regulations,
income “generally may not include any long-term capital gains. However, in conformance with the applicable state statute, income may be defined as or
satisfied by a unitrust amount, or pursuant to a
trustee’s power to adjust between income and principal
to fulfill the trustee’s duty of impartiality, if the state
statute both provides for a reasonable apportionment
between the income and remainder beneficiaries of the
total return of the trust and meets the requirements of
[reg.] section 1.643(b)-1.” Nonetheless, a trustee may
not, in making an equitable adjustment, allocate to income the proceeds from the sale or exchange of any
asset contributed to the fund by the donor or purchased
by the fund, at least to the extent of the fair market
value of the asset on the date of contribution or purchase. Here again the regulations appear to adopt an
operational test: As long as the trustee does not make
an impermissible allocation, the regulation appears to
be satisfied. The new final regulations provide this
“definition of income applies for taxable years beginning after January 2, 2004.” The apparent purpose of
the requirement of allocating at least that portion of
proceeds or a sale or exchange equal to the fair market
value at the time of contribution or purchase is to

59

In the alternative, one might consider the possibility of
changing the trust’s situs. For a further discussion about
changing a trust’s situs, see below.
60
A reformation may also be effectuated by a nonjudicial
arrangement if valid under local law, provided that it is completed in accordance with the period applicable to the commencement of a judicial reformation proceeding.
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preserve for the charitable remainder beneficiary the
amount on which the income and any gift tax deduction was based.
It seems in some ways that these two new pooled
income fund rules are inconsistent. The first one denies
the income tax set-aside deduction to the fund under
section 642(c) if the trustee can convert the trust into a
unitrust or exercise a power to adjust. But the second
rule provides that a pooled income fund may, in effect,
define income as a unitrust amount and pay that
amount to the income beneficiaries or allow the trustee
to exercise a power to adjust. Perhaps, that apparent
inconsistency can be explained in the following way.
Although the first rule denies the trust an income tax
deduction when it can convert to a unitrust (or the
trustee can exercise a power to adjust), the fund nevertheless may qualify as a pooled income fund under
section 642(c)(5) so the donor is entitled to an income
tax deduction under section 170(f)(2)(B). That would
appear to be an appropriate reconciliation of two seemingly inconsistent concerns: (1) the interest in permitting trustees to invest for total return undeterred by
adverse tax consequences; and (2) the need to prevent
set-aside deductions for any amount that may pass to
a noncharitable beneficiary.

B. Charitable Remainder Trusts
Earlier amendments to the regulations relating to
income-only charitable-remainder unitrusts required
that the proceeds from the sale or exchange of any
assets contributed by the grantor be allocated to principal at least to the extent of the fair market value of
those assets on the date of their contribution, for tax
years ending after April 18, 1997. See reg. section 1.6643(b)(4) (before the new final regulations). Those regulations were also expanded. First, although the regulations provide th at income for such a charitable
remainder trust (an income-only CRUT) generally
means income as defined in the section 643(b) regulations, the new regulations provide that trust income
may not be determined using a fixed percentage of the
annual fair market value of the trust property (that is,
cannot be determined by a unitrust regime), despite
any contrary provision in state law.61 That new rule is

61
State law may or may not prohibit an income-only CRUT
from defining income as a unitrust amount. In New York, for
example, a trust may not “convert” to a unitrust payment
regime if amounts have been permanently set aside for charity
and the income also is not exclusively devoted to charity.
EPTL 11-2.4(c)(9). The language tracks section 642(c), which
suggests that it may apply only when a charitable deduction
is allowable under that section. Section 642(c) has no application to a CRT and, as a result, this provision of New York law
may not prevent the use of a unitrust amount in determining
income of the trust. However, EPTL 11-2.4(e)(5)(A) requires
that the determination of whether the section applies (that is,
whether the income may be determined by a unitrust amount)
depends on many factors, including the intention of the person who created the trust. Presumably, the person who created
the CRT wanted it to qualify for CRT treatment under section
664 and its regulations. The use of a unitrust amount to define

(Footnote 61 continued in next column.)
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applicable for tax years ending after January 2, 2004.
The rule that proceeds from the sale or exchange of any
assets contributed by the grantor must be allocated to
corpus at least to the extent of fair market value at the
date of contribution is expanded to apply also (similar
to the rule made applicable to pooled income funds) to
the proceeds from a sale or exchange of any assets
purchased by the trust. That change regarding purchased assets applies to tax years ending after January
2, 2004. Otherwise, proceeds from the sale or exchange
may be allocated to income, under the terms of the
governing instrument, if not prohibited by applicable
local law. A discretionary power to make that allocation
may be granted to the trustee under the terms of the
governing instrument, but only to the extent that the
state statute permits the trustee to make adjustments
between income and corpus to treat beneficiaries impartially. Those changes also are applicable to years
ending after January 2, 2004.

It seems in some ways that these two
new pooled income fund rules are
inconsistent.
It seems that that requirement concerning sale
proceeds has the effect of overriding an otherwise applicable state law. For example, state law provides
under its “unproductive property” provision that a
portion of the proceeds of sale (whether or not at a gain
or loss) is allocated to income when the property while
held by the trust has produced no income. If the trustee
were to comply with the state statute and, as a result,
allocate proceeds to income, even when the asset is sold
for less than its value at the time of contribution or
purchase, a violation of the regulation would occur.
That operational defect might result in the IRS taking
the position, as it did successfully in Estate of Atkinson
v. Commissioner,62 t h a t a fa i l u re t o adm i n is t er a
charitable remainder trust should cause a forfeiture of
all tax benefits from the trust’s inception. It would
seem that, in the case of a new instrument, it would be
prudent to override any applicable unproductive
property statute and to include language that mirrors
the requirement in the regulation. In addition, legislation that would render any such statute inapplicable
to an income-only CRUT should be considered.63

income would seem to frustrate that intention (because it
would disqualify the trust) and, as a result, this provision of
the EPTL may be construed as prohibiting the use of a unitrust
amount as the income of the trust. Nevertheless, the matter
does not appear certain. It therefore would be safer expressly
to prohibit in the instrument the use of a unitrust amount as
income rather than relying on uncertain state law. In any case,
states probably should amend their statutes to prohibit the
application of their unitrust-amount-as-income laws from applying to income-only CRUTs.
62
309 F.3d 1290, Doc 2002-23464, 2002 TNT 202-20 (11th Cir.
2002).
63
Indeed, any new governing instrument probably should
mandate that proceeds from the sale or exchange of any
assets be allocated in accordance with the regulation.
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1. Summary of charitable changes. As noted, the new
charitable changes are applicable for tax years after
January 2, 2004. However, it may be that the trust or
pooled income fund was created previously, and either
applicable state law or the terms of the instrument
provide for or authorize an allocation that is prohibited
by the new regulations. Although the trustee might
refuse to distribute proceeds of the sale to the income
beneficiaries, that could violate the terms of the trust
or local law — in other words, the income beneficiaries
may be entitled to those proceeds. If the governing
instrument or local law provides that the trustee may
amend the governing instrument to ensure qualification, then presumably the trustee could cure that
deficiency. But if the governing instrument does not so
provide, the appropriate course of action for the trustee
is unclear. Perhaps, the fiduciary should commence a
proceeding seeking a reformation, although not all
states permit a reformation. The trustee might consider
a construction (interpretation) proceeding to have a
court rule that the provision of state law or the governing instrument authorizing the allocation that is now
prohibited shall no longer apply. Of course, that might
eliminate rights of the beneficiaries to payments. It
would be difficult to argue that that elimination is a
gift by the beneficiaries (and perhaps therefore an improper additional contribution to the CRUT) or is an
income-taxable event, but it would be a change in the
quality of what the beneficiaries were entitled to
receive. As noted above, the new regulations provide
only narrow relief from gift and income tax consequences by reason of a “conversion” in the type of
interest a beneficiary held (for example, from a
“straight” income interest to a unitrust interest). It
probably would have been appropriate for the regulations to have been made prospective so that they would
not apply to preexisting trusts or funds. Unfortunately,
that was not done.

VIII. New Deemed Gain Rules
Reg. section 1.651(a)-2 is expanded by adding a new
subparagraph (d). It provides that if a trust distributes
noncash property as part of its requirement to distribute all of its income, the trust is treated as having
sold the property (with realization of gain or loss) for
its fair market value on the date of that distribution.
The requirement that gain be recognized when property is distributed by a fiduciary to a beneficiary was first
adopted by the courts. See, for example, Kenan v. Commissioner.64 It was later embraced in the regulations.
The new version of this regulation expands the circumstances when a distribution will trigger the recognition
of gain. While the gain-recognition rule under the case

64
114 F.2d 217 (2nd Cir. 1940). Note, however, that the subparagraph goes on to state that a trust will not fail to be treated
for purposes of section 651 as one that must distribute all of
its income and makes no other distribution by reason of distributing a noncash asset in satisfaction of the beneficiary’s
right to the trust’s income for the year, provided the trust
makes no distribution in excess of the income as defined in
section 643(b) and its regulations.
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law and the earlier version of the regulation applied
only when the beneficiary was entitled to receive a
fixed dollar amount or specific property, the new rule
triggers gain when a noncash distribution is made to
an income beneficiary if the trust requires the distribution of income. Thus, whether a unitrust regime or a
conventional income approach is used, a noncash distribution to the income beneficiary in a trust mandating
the distribution of income will trigger gain. Similarly,
although not entirely clear, it would seem that if a
trustee of that trust were to convert principal to income
an d mak e a n onca sh dis tribut ion to a n income
beneficiary under an equitable adjustment power, gain
will be triggered.
It should be emphasized that the expansion effected
under the new rule is not inconsiderable. In Kenan, a
foundational case on the issue, the court was at pains
to distinguish the fiduciary’s discharge of a fixed,
pecuniary obligation — which the court held triggered
gain — from a distribution in discharge of a residuary
gift or a gift of trust corpus, both of which tend to vary
in value during the period of administration. In other
words, the court determined that gain recognition
would be inappropriate if the amount of the gift
depended on circumstances evolving during the trust’s
administration. And, as indicated, the earlier version
of the regulation adopted the same distinction between
fixed and varying gifts. Under the new rule, that distinction is abandoned, with distributions of income —
a varying gift — now treated in the same fashion as a
fixed gift.
What accounts for this expansion? Perhaps the
drafters started with the premise that in a charitable
remainder unitrust, an existing regulation triggers gain
where a noncash distribution of appreciated property
is made in satisfaction of the unitrust amount.65 The
charitable-remainder-unitrust rule was itself, however,
a considerable expansion of the Kenan principle. For it
would seem that a beneficiary entitled to receive, say,
6 percent of the trust’s assets each year is, in substance,
in the same position as a remainderman entitled to
receive 6 percent of the corpus at the termination of the
trust.66 In both cases, the gift is not fixed but will vary
based on events occurring during the trust’s administration. In any event, having decided to extend the rule
beyond the charitable-remainder-unitrust context, the
draft ers were pre sumably con cerned about discriminating between distributions made to conventional income beneficiaries and those entitled to receive a
unitrust amount. It is understandable, therefore, that
they made the new gain-triggering rule applicable in
both cases. After all, the choice that trustees and settlors must make between the use of a conventional
income approach and a unitrust approach should not
be dictated or influenced by tax rules but by nontax
objectives.

65

See reg. section 1.664-1(d)(5).
Cf. Rev. Rul. 69-486, 1969-2 C.B. 159; LTR 9401030, 94 TNT
6-52; LTR 9324015, 93 TNT 131-60; LTR 9830017, Doc 98-23347,
98 TNT 143-52.
66
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Yet the regulation does unfairly discriminate on
another critical issue in a manner that will unquestionably impinge on how trusts are drafted: It makes
the new gain-triggering rule inapplicable to discretionary trusts. As a consequence, if the trust is not designed
to satisfy the marital deduction provision (or some
other provision that similarly requires that the instrument mandate a current distribution of income), a planner might well suggest the use of a discretionary trust
to avoid any possible acceleration of gain on appreciated property held in the trust. The new gain-triggering rule also creates a more subtle form of discrimination. While a distribution of appreciated
property by a QTIP trustee to the surviving spouse will
trigger gain even though the asset is to remain in the
family (that is, in the hands of the surviving spouse),
no such acceleration of gain would be required if the
marital bequest had been outright instead. A surviving
spouse receiving an outright bequest would not be
required to recognize gain on appreciated assets until
he or she decided to dispose of it by sale or exchange.
That violates the notion that the choice between the
QTIP and an outright marital bequest should be made
by the spouses without regard to tax consequences.67
Another criticism of the regulation is that it is overbroad. For example, if a nontaxable stock dividend is
received by a trust and under state law the dividend
is allocated to income,68 the distribution of that stock
to the income beneficiary should not be treated as a
sale. In other words, it would seem that gain recognition should be triggered only if the noncash asset is not
inherently income. As indicated above, there is even a
danger that the distribution of noncash assets pursuant
to a power to adjust (for example, the trustee converts
an appreciated share of stock from the corpus account
to the income account) may be regarded as a sale. That
result would seem unfair and unwarranted. Nevertheless, the deference the courts have shown to regulations
and the interpretation of ambiguous regulations by the
agency that promulgated them (here the Treasury
Department) may mean that construction would be
upheld. 69 Because the definition-of-income regulations
will treat as the trust’s fiduciary accounting income the
amount of that income determined not just by traditional principles but after the application of a state
authorized power to adjust, it seems that it may be best
not to mandate the distribution of FAI from a trust
(unless required as with some marital deduction

67
Parenthetically, note that the courts have construed the
QTIP provision in a way that creates unfortunate discrimination as between this type of marital bequest and an outright
bequest. See Estate of Mellinger, 112 T.C. 26, Doc 1999-3887, 1999
TNT 17-6 (1999), acq. AOD 1999-0006, Doc 1999-29234, 1999
TNT 173-11. And there may be other differences as well — as,
for example, when the QTIP realized capital gains, which
remain taxable to the trust rather than to the spouse.
68
That was the rule under New York law, for example, for
stock dividends not in excess of 6 percent, before it adopted
EPTL art. 11-A (the new Uniform Income and Principal Act).
EPTL 11-2.1(e)(3)(A).
69
See Mitchell M. Gans, “Deference and the End of Tax
Practice,” 36 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 731 (2002).
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trusts).70 However, it may not be possible to avoid gain
recognition if the trustee has converted a “straight”
income trust to a unitrust.
The realization-of-gain rule in reg. section 1.661(a)2(f) is similarly revised. That regulation has long required that gain or loss is realized by an estate or trust
if a noncash distribution is made in satisfaction of a
right to receive a distribution in a specific dollar
amount or in specific property other than that distributed. As revised, the regulation expands the gaintriggering rule to cover noncash distributions if income
is required to be distributed currently. As with the new
regulation under section 651, this new gain/loss
realization rule probably should not apply when the
noncash asset already is part of income but might be
so construed. Finally, the regulations fail to address the
consequences to the beneficiary when the fiduciary distributes cash in satisfaction of the beneficiary’s right to
a noncash asset. It may well be that the beneficiary is
treated as realizing gain or loss if the fiduciary is authorized to make the cash distribution in that satisfaction.

IX. Marital Deduction Matters
As mentioned above, the marital deduction regulations (other than those dealing with QDOTs) had
focused on the status of the beneficiary-spouse as the
income beneficiary rather than on the definition of income.71 But the new regulations add an apparent safe
harbor, under which the beneficiary-spouse will be
deemed to have the requisite income interest. Specifically, reg. sections 20.2056(b)-5(f)(1) and 25.2523(e)1(f)(1) are amended to provide that the interest of the
beneficiary-spouse is sufficient if the spouse is entitled
to the fiduciary accounting income as determined by
applicable local law providing for a reasonable apport i o n m e n t b e tw e e n th e in c om e an d re m ai n de r
beneficiaries of the total return of the trust (assuming
it meets the requirements of the reg. section 1.643(b)-1
rules).
That means that the spouse’s income interest in a
trust that qualifies for the marital deduction may be a
unitrust interest with a payment of between 3 percent
and 5 percent per year if provided under state law.72
The final regulations do not deem a unitrust to satisfy

70
For example, to constitute a qualified subchapter S trust
(QSST), the trust must distribute all of its FAI annually, but it
need not be required by its terms to do so. Hence, it may be
better to authorize the distribution of FAI in a QSST — it seems
that should avoid gain recognition if appreciated assets are
distributed to the sole beneficiary of the QSST.
71
It is possible that this developed because the sections
refer to the spouse getting a life estate and not all of the
income.
72
As mentioned earlier, reg. section 1.643(b)-1 creates a 3
percent minimum and 5 percent maximum unitrust percentage. Sometimes, a percentage lower than 3 percent or higher
than 5 percent might be deemed to constitute an income
interest under the regulation but, as stated earlier, consideration might be given to obtaining a private letter ruling
to that effect in the absence of further guidance from the IRS
or the Treasury Department.

911

(C) Tax Analysts 2004. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

the safe harbor unless state law explicitly permits it.
Thus, even if the instrument calls for a unitrust of
between 3 percent and 5 percent, the safe harbor is not
satisfied unless the unitrust amount is dictated by state
law.73
Similarly, the safe harbor will be available even if,
under state law, the fiduciary is authorized to make
equitable adjustments between income and principal.
As with the unitrust, the mere inclusion of the power
in the governing instrument will not suffice.
Under a QTIP trust described in section 2057(b)(7)
or 2523(f), the marital deduction is not permitted if
anyone has the power to distribute trust property to a
person other than the spouse. Reg. section 20.2056(b)7(d)(1) has been amended to clarify that the trustee’s
authority to adjust between income and corpus to fulfill the trustee’s duty of impartiality, as contemplated
in reg. section 1.643(b)-1, will not violate that requirement.74
As mentioned above, the QDOT regulations had
provided deta iled rules abou t w ha t con stitutes
fiduciary accounting income (distributions of which
avoid the imposition of estate tax). The regulation75
now provides that distributions will be considered income from a QDOT to the extent that they are made in
conformance with applicable local law that defines income as a unitrust amount (or permits a right to income
to be satisfied by that amount) or that permits the
trustee to adjust receipts between principal and income
to fulfill the fiduciary’s duty of impartiality (assuming
the local-law requirement in reg. section 1.643(b)-1 is
satisfied).
These changes provide two potential significant
new opportunities for the spouse who is the beneficiary
of QDOT. First, it permits the trust to distribute an
amount in excess of what had been fiduciary accounting income as limited under the prior regulations
without the imposition of estate tax. For example, if
the trustee converts the QDOT to a 5 percent unitrust
under state law, no estate tax is imposed on the distribution even though it exceeds what FAI would have
been (i) without regard to the unitrust conversion and
(ii) without regard to the limitations in the prior QDOT
regulations. Similarly, the increased amount of FAI
payable to the beneficiary spouse of a QDOT pursuant

73
Under section 2056(b)(8) and 2523(g), the value of a
unitrust interest may qualify for the estate or gift tax marital
deduction. It may be appropriate to note that under reg. section 20.2056(b)-5(f)(1) the unitrust interest causes the value of
the entire trust to qualify for the marital deduction rather than
just the value of the unitrust interest. It seems certain, however, that the marital deduction trust could provide for the
beneficiary-spouse to receive the greater of income (as defined
under state law) or a unitrust amount.
74
Apparently because the regulations promulgated under
section 2523(f) (on lifetime QTIPs) make reference to the regulations under section 2056(b)(7), the Treasury Department
determined that it was not necessary to revise the regulations
under section 2523(f) as they were under section 2056(b)(7).
See reg. section 25.2523(f)-1(c)(1).
75
See reg. section 20.2056A-5(c)(2).
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to exercise of a power to adjust (granted under state
law) is not subject to estate tax. Second, although the
prior QDOT regulations had provided that in no event
could capital gain be considered to be part of FAI, it
seems nearly certain that capital gain can be allocated
to FAI if the definition-of-income regulations are satisfied.
As indicated above, the allocation of gain to FAI may
cause it to form part of DNI. (Capital gain is always
included in DNI if the trust is not a U.S. trust. It is
understood that most QDOTs are U.S. trusts.) Having
capital gain included in DNI provides the opportunity
to allow the trust a deduction for that gain and for its
inclusion in the gross income of the trust beneficiary.76
If the trust beneficiary is not a U.S. income taxpayer,
the capital gain included in DNI and distributed to the
beneficiary may not be subject to U.S. income taxation.77

X. Foreign Trusts
Under what are known as the “throwback” rules,
DNI accumulated in a foreign trust and not currently
treated as paid to a trust beneficiary so as to be included in the beneficiary’s gross income and then may
be later taxed to a beneficiary when it is ultimately paid
or treated as paid to a trust beneficiary.78 Those “accumulation distributions” are subject to a harsher tax
regime than current distributions. All tax income (except tax-exempt income) forming part of an accumulation distribution is treated as being ordinary income
and an interest charge is imposed on the tax due.79
However, an accumulation distribution can be treated
as having occurred only to the extent the distribution
exceeds FAI for the year.80 Hence, if FAI is increased
by the conversion of the trust to a unitrust, by the
exercise of a power to adjust, or by the allocation of
gain to FAI from the sale or exchange of trust assets,
as authorized in the definition-of-income regulations,
more may be distributed without being treated as an
accumulation distribution for purposes of the throwback rule.

XI. Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxation
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 enacted section 2601,
which imposes a tax on all generation-skipping transfers. The tax generally does not apply to any trust that

76

See section 651-652, 661-662.
Presumably, a U.S. tax will be imposed on gain realized
on the sale of U.S. real estate: The capital gain is either taxed
to the trust or is subject to withholding pursuant to section
1445 on account of its distribution to a foreign beneficiary.
See reg. section 1.1445-5(c). Parenthetically, note that in determining whether the capital gain is treated as having been
distributed to the beneficiary for purposes of withholding,
the concept of DNI is not used. Instead, reg. section 1.14455(c) creates a separate mechanism for making that determination.
78
Section 665-668.
79
Section 667(a), 668(a).
80
Section 665(b).
77
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was irrevocable before 1987 or other “grandparented”
trusts, except to the extent of subsequent additions. In
2000 the Treasury Department promulgated final regulations on grandparenting of trusts from the generation-skipping transfer tax. Those regulations generally
provide that a modification of a trust that does not
result in shift of additional property to a person or class
of persons to whom the GSTT would apply is not an
addition. Thus, in the absence of that shift, the trust
will not lose its exemption from the tax. Example 8 to
reg. section 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(E) provides that a “conversion” of a trust mandating the payment of FAI to
one mandating the payment of the greater of a
“straight” income interest or a unitrust percentage
(which percentage is not specified in the example) is
not a modification that would cause the trust to lose
its grandparenting.
The new final regulations amend these grandparenting rules. Reg. section 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i) is amended to
state that, except as otherwise provided, the changes
apply only when determining whether a trust that is
exempt for GSTT purposes retains that exemption and
not when determining whether a “transaction” (1) is a
gift, (2) may cause the trust to be included in the gross
estate of a beneficiary, or (3) may result in gain realization under section 1001. This new regulation then goes
on to modify subparagraph (D)(2) of reg. section
26.2601-1(b)(4)(ii), by providing that the administration
of a trust in conformance with applicable local law that
defines income as a unitrust amount (or permits a right
to income to be satisfied by that amount) or that grants
the trustee an equitable adjustment power will not be
considered to effect an impermissible shift (assuming
the definition-of-income regulations are otherwise
satisfied).
There may or may not be an important distinction
between Example 8 of reg. section 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(E)
and new reg. section 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(D)(2). It may be
that the former determines whether the conversion from
an income to a unitrust interest is a shift of beneficial
interests so as to cause grandparenting to be lost. The
latter may determine whether the administration of an
income trust as a unitrust or the exercise of a power to
adjust will cause shift of beneficial interests so as to
cause grandparenting to be lost. However, this distinction does not seem to be important and probably is not
intended. Certainly, if the conversion does not result
in a loss of grandparenting, neither should the administration of the trust in accordance with the conversion
cause it to be lost.
In any case, as mentioned above, the definition-ofincome regulation provides a safe harbor unitrust
range of 3 percent to 5 percent. Although, as also discussed, a conversion to a unitrust percentage lower
than 3 percent or higher than 5 percent does not “automatically” mean that the regulation is violated. In any
event, a conversion to a unitrust in excess of 5 percent
should not cause loss of grandparenting. Example 8 of
reg. section 26.2601-1(b)(4)(i)(E) sets forth no minimum
or maximum unitrust percentage, although it has the
“straight” income interest as the floor. The drafters
obviously embraced this result because they realized
that, given the floor, no impermissible shift could
TAX NOTES, May 17, 2004

occur. Parenthetically, the 3 percent minimum seems
generous since section 7520 has never assigned an income interest a rate of less than 3 percent.

XII. Areas Not Covered
As emphasized above, the meaning of fiduciary accounting income is important for tax purposes outside
subchapter J. For example, as discussed, its meaning is
important in determining whether a transfer to a trust
qualifies for the estate or gift tax marital deduction.
Typically, the entire amount transferred to that trust
qualifies even though the spouse may only be entitled
to the income. See, for example, section 2056(b)(7). But
sometimes only the interest to which the spouse is
entitled qualifies. For example, the unitrust or annuity
in terest of th e g ran tor ’s spou se in a charitable
remainder trust may qualify for the gift or estate tax
ma rital deduction . Section s 2523 (g ), 2056(b)(8).
Similarly, a remainder interest vested in the grantor’s
spouse following an income interest for someone else
qualifies for the ma rital deduction because the
remainder is not a terminable interest. But the partial
interest that so qualifies must be valued. There is no
guidance as to how, for example, a remainder vested
in the spouse will be valued if it follows an income
interest for someone else when the income interest can
be converted into a unitrust or when the trustee holds
a power to adjust. Thus, it is unclear whether the
remainder should be valued on the premise that it follows an income interest (valued under section 7520) or
on the premise that it follows a unitrust interest (which,
as explained above, probably will be limited to a range
of between 3 percent and 5 percent and may be quite
different from the section 7520 rate).
Section 2702 prescribes a zero value for an income
interest retained by a property owner who transfers a
remainder interest to or for a family member. But the
section does not apply when the remainder is given to
someone who is not a family member. The value of the
remainder in the latter case is determined by subtracting the value of the retained income interest from the
value of the property itself. No guidance is provided
as to how that income interest will be valued when the
trustee may convert the trust to a unitrust or may exercise a power to adjust. Similarly, no guidance is provided as to how a retained interest in a (qualified)
personal residence trust (which is an exception to the
“zero value” rule of section 2702) is to be determined
— in addition to the use of the personal residence
owned by the trust, the grantor must receive all
fiduciary accounting income earned in the trust during
the retained term.
The regulations fail to address other valuation questions as well. For example, the regulations are silent as
to how an income interest held by a beneficiary who
dies within 10 years of the decedent is to be valued for
purposes of the prior transfer credit under section 2013.
In other words, the regulations fail to provide a valuation method in this context that takes into account the
possibility that the trustee will convert to a unitrust or
exercise a power to adjust.
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XIII. Changes in Trust Situs
As emphasized throughout, the exercise of a power
to adjust or conversion to a unitrust payment regime
will be respected only if done under a state law.
Similarly, the safe harbor under which a switch between methods is permitted without adverse tax consequence is available only if made under a state
statute.81
For several reasons, it may be appropriate to change
the situs of a trust to a state that has a statute permitting
conversions to unitrusts or the exercise of a power to
adjust. The new GSTT regulations, issued in connection
with the definition-of-income regulations, contain two
examples (Examples 11 and 12) that conclude that such
a change in the situs of a trust from a state that has no
such statute to one that does (or the reverse) will not
cause any beneficiary to be treated as having made a
taxable gift or as having made an income-taxable exchange.
A change of situs may not necessarily alter the law
governing the trust. If the instrument contains a choiceof-law provision, it may continue to control even after
a change in situs.82 Thus, if a trust is located in a jurisdiction that does not provide for a unitrust or equitable-adjustment regime, changing its situs to a jurisdiction that does have such a regime may not be
sufficient (to permit a unitrust conversion or to exercise
a power to adjust) if the instrument contains a choiceof-law provision directing that the law of the original
jurisdiction is to govern.83 On the other hand, in the
absence of a choice-of-law provision, the law of the
state of administration will probably control questions
concerning allocations between principal and income.84 Thus, if the instrument fails to contain a choiceof-law provision, it may be easier to secure tax recogn ition for a move t o a sta te with a unitrust or
equitable-adjustment regime. This suggests that, when
possible, any court order authorizing a change in the
situs of the trust should include a direction also for a
change in the law that governs the determination of its
income and corpus.85

81

While the text of the regulation contemplates that the
switch may occur without adverse tax consequence if done
under state case law, the preamble provides as follows: “This
provision [authorizing a switch without adverse tax consequence] does not apply to switches between methods not
specifically authorized by state statute.”
82
See Restatement of Conflicts (Second) section 272, comments c and e.
83
Even when the instrument does contain a choice-of-law
provision, it may nonetheless be possible to alter the governing law. See, e.g., NY EPTL 10-6.9 (providing that the donee
of a power of appointment may, in exercising the power,
provide for the law of a different state to control).
84
See Restatement of Conflicts (Second) section 268.
85
The Uniform Income and Principal Act, as well as at least
some states that have adopted a power to adjust regime, grants
the trustee the power to adjust only if the trustee is investing
pursuant to that state’s version of the Prudent Investor Act. If
the governing instrument has provided that the trustee shall
not invest pursuant to that act, the ability to exercise the power
to adjust is presumably foreclosed in such jurisdiction.
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XIV. Some Additional Planning Thoughts
A. Allocating Gain to FAI
It is not certain that a power to adjust granted by a
state statute or under the instrument authorizes the
trustee to allocate realized gain to FAI. The Uniform
Act merely authorizes the trustee to allocate corpus to
income (or the reverse). It does not explicitly authorize
the trustee to allocate realized gain to income. Realized
gain is a tax concept and therefore unlikely to appear
in a state statute (other than a state tax statute). Perhaps, the trustee will be permitted to allocate proceeds
of sale to FAI pursuant to a power to adjust, thus causing the capital gain inherent in the proceeds to be included in DNI. But even that remains unclear. Hence,
even if state law grants the trustee a power to adjust,
it would be prudent to include in the governing instrument discretionary authority to allocate realized gain
to FAI (reasonably and impartially) to achieve the planning advantages discussed above.86 In fact, it seems
that states should adopt a default rule granting trustees
this power in those cases in which it grants a power to
adjust or perhaps when the instrument authorizes a
discretionary corpus invasion (thereby permitting the
trustee to allocate realized gain to income through a
corpus invasion).
In existing trusts, in the absence of such state legislation, it may nevertheless be possible for the trustee
to use a power in the instrument to allocate receipts
between principal and income to achieve the desired
effect. As indicated, in TAM 8728001, the Service concluded that a trustee with that power under the instrument could cause realized gain to be allocated to FAI
and, as a result, to be included in DNI. Whether that
strategy remains viable is unclear, however, given the
regulations’ failure to either embrace or reject the conclusion reached in the TAM and the absence of any
published guidance on the question.

B. Unitrusts and Receipts
Because of the uncertainty of the tax effects of
having the trustee exercise a power to adjust or paying
a unitrust amount when state law does not explicitly
provide for it, it seems that it will be preferable to have
the trust governed by the laws of a state that has a
statute expressly authorizing the trustee to do so. Some
states have express rules as to how to make their trust
laws apply (see, for example, Alaska Statute 13.36.035),
although it seems that this is an administrative matter
and no specific nexus to that state seems to be required
for the laws of a particular state to apply other than an
explicit direction in the instrument. See Restatement of
Conflicts (Second) section 268. As for a will, it may be
appropriate to direct original probate in a state that
permits nonresidents to do that and provide that the
laws of that state will govern, including the trustee’s
ability to exercise a power to adjust or convert any
income trust into a unitrust. See, for example, New
York EPTL 3-5.1(h), Alaska Statute 13.38.300.

86
This also will ensure that the trust will be treated, for the
purposes discussed above, as paying or being required to pay
FAI, although the importance of that is uncertain.
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It seems that a conversion of an income interest into
a unitrust other than pursuant to state statute (or to a
unitrust with a payout of less than 3 percent or more
than 5 percent, even if pursuant to a state statute)
should probably no longer be undertaken without
receiving a private letter ruling from the IRS given the
implication in the regulations and the preamble that a
taxable gift or taxable gain might occur. Although arguments might be maintained that that conversion by
the trustee cannot be a gain or gift event for the
beneficiary (assuming the beneficiary is not the trustee), many will not wish to take the risk.87

C. Having Capital Gain Form Part of DNI
When it will be preferable as a general rule to have
capital gains form part of DNI so they will be included
in the beneficiary’s income may be difficult to discern.
While the federal capital gain rate is now as low as 15
percent, this rate will no longer apply after 2008. Moreover, it is impossible to predict the impact of future
legislation. Nonetheless, for smaller trusts, it may be
preferable for capital gain to be taxed to the trust because the trust’s tax rate may be lower than if distributed to the beneficiary. Often, the trust may be
structured so as to avoid state and local income taxes
that a beneficiary cannot avoid, which also suggests
that it may be preferable for the gain to be taxed to the
trust. On the other hand, a beneficiary may have an
otherwise unused capital loss that could shelter a gain
realized by the trust from tax if that gain could be
allocated to the beneficiary. Or it may be preferable to
tax the gain to the beneficiary if the beneficiary would
not be subject to state or local income tax on a gain that
would otherwise be subject to that tax in the hands of
the trustee.
Given that uncertainty, it would seem that the most
effective approach would be to give the trustee discretion regarding distributions (provided that doing so
does not create any adverse consequence such as disallowance of the marital deduction or a disqualification
of the trust for purposes of the state law rules concerning the minimum amount that must be bequeathed to
a spouse). Giving the trustee that discretion may not,
however, create the necessary year-to-year flexibility,
because the regulations provide that a discretionary
distribution of corpus will cause capital gain to be
included in DNI only if the trustee is consistent (makes,
as suggested, what is in effect an irrevocable election).
The regulations do, however, permit capital gain to be
included in DNI when the trustee is given the discretion to allocate realized gain to FAI (if exercised impartially and reasonably). And because the regulations do
not impose a consistency requirement in this context,
a trustee having that discretion can decide on a yearly
basis whether a better tax outcome would be achieved
by causing capital gain to be included in or excluded
from DNI. It would therefore seem prudent, as a general matter, to include that discretion in all new instruments. Indeed, the flexibility produced by that kind of

87
See LTR 200231011, Doc 2002-17961, 2002 TNT 150-29 (concluding that the conversion was an income-taxable exchange).
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discretionary authority creates a competitive advantage for a discretionary trust over a unitrust. In
other words, while the consistency requirement that
the regulations impose on a unitrust forces the trustee
into making an irrevocable election at the outset
regarding the treatment of capital gain for DNI purposes, the discretionary approach permits the trustee
to take into account evolving circumstances. Thus, putting other considerations aside, it will not be surprising
if planners tend to opt for the discretionary trust over
the unitrust.88
In addition, as indicated, the tax treatment of an
equitable adjustment remains unclear. In contrast, the
regulations clearly provide that realized capital gain
will be included in DNI if appropriately allocated to
FAI. Until further guidance is provided for the treatment of an equitable adjustment, conservative practitioners may feel more comfortable using the discretionary allocation of gains to FAI.
Of course, a well-informed trustee will consider factors beyond the tax consequence. For instance, the trustee will consider whether the invasion will cause
property to face claims of creditors of the beneficiary
(including any spousal right of election to a minimum
share of the estate of the income beneficiary), whether
the invasion will result in the diversion of the trust
property to someone different from those the grantor
of the trust would want to receive trust property (for
example, to the income beneficiary’s spouse rather
than the income beneficiary’s descendants), and
whether taking the property out of the trust will cause
it to face higher wealth transfer taxes than if it stayed
in the trust (for example, the trust is “exempt” from
GSTT).
All of the foregoing suggests changes in both state
statutes and governing instruments. State statutes
probably should authorize trustees (as well as executors, although the extent to which the new rules
apply to executors is uncertain, at least in some
respects) to “deem” discretionary distributions of income or corpus as consisting of realized capital gain.
It does not seem that the governing instrument or state
law must impose a reasonable and impartial requirement on the trustee in exercising that “deeming” authority. Also, state statutes should be revised to authorize expressly a fiduciary, as part of the power to adjust,
to pay corpus to the income beneficiary (as opposed to
converting corpus to income) and to select a tax-character ordering rule if the trust becomes a unitrust. The
latter (that is, selection of a tax-character ordering rule)
also should be in governing instruments (assuming the
grantor does not wish to prohibit a conversion from an
income trust to a unitrust).

D. Considerations for New Income-Only CRTs
The limitation on treating proceeds of sale as
fiduciary accounting income of income-only charitable

88
In any given case, the treatment of capital gains for tax
purposes may be less important than other considerations,
such as “predictability” of annual distributions under a
unitrust regime.

915

(C) Tax Analysts 2004. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT

remainder trusts may diminish their use, unless it is
anticipated that the trust will produce income sufficient to fund the desired payments. Usually, those CRTs
are used when the unitrust recipient wishes to delay
receiving payments so the taxable income of the trust
may build inside the trust income tax-free. However,
depending on investment performance, the unitrust
recipient may be foreclosed from receiving significant
distributions. As a result, it is often appropriate to
include a “flip” provision so that the trust can be converted from an income-only type to a regular unitrust.
See reg. section 1.664-3(c). Although the unitrust recipient forfeits any right to “make up” payments when
the “flip” occurs, the recipient would thereafter at least
receive the full unitrust amount. In short, given the
limitation imposed by the regulations on opportunities
to allocate proceeds of sale to income in the case of an
income-only trust, the regulations make it even more
important to consider the use of a “flip” provision.

E. Sample Provisions
As indicated above, it may be appropriate, or sometimes necessary, to have some documents contain
specific provisions in light of the final regulations.
For some noncharitable trusts (but not for charitable
lead trusts if there are no continuing trusts after the
charitable term) the following provisions may be considered:89
The {TRUSTEES} (other than any Trustee who is
a beneficiary hereunder and other than the grantor) may allocate within the meaning of reg. section 1.643(a)-3(b) to income or to principal, or
partly to income and partly to principal, all or
part of the realized gains from the sale or exchange of trust assets; provided, however, that, if
income is defined under an applicable state
statute as a unitrust amount and the trust is being
administered pursuant to such statute, the allocation of gains to income must be exercised consis-

89
These sample provisions are derived from Wealth Transfer Planning (a computerized document assembly and expert
advise system of which Jonathan G. Blattmachr and Michael
L. Graham are the authors) and are reproduced here with the
permission of Interactive Legal Systems LLC (http://www.
ilsdocs.com).

tently and the amount so allocated may not be
greater than the excess of the unitrust amount
over the amount of distributable net income
det er min e d w ith out reg ard to reg . s ection
1.643(a)-3(b).
The {TRUSTEES} (other than any Trustee who is
a beneficiary hereunder and other than the grantor) may deem, within the meaning of reg. section
1.643(a)-3(e), any discretionary distribution of
principal as being paid from capital gains realized during the year. The {TRUSTEES} (other than
any Trustee who is a beneficiary hereunder and
other than the grantor) may take any action that
may be necessary in order for such deeming to be
respected for tax purposes.
The {TRUSTEES} (other than any Trustee who is
a beneficiary hereunder and other than the grantor) may, within the meaning of reg. section
1.643(a)-3(e), specify the tax character of any
unitrust amount paid hereunder. The {TRUST EES } ( ot h e r t h a n a n y Tru s t e e w h o i s a
beneficiary hereunder and other than the grantor)
may take any action that may be necessary in
order for such specification to be respected for tax
purposes.
For income-only charitable remainder trusts, the following provisions should be contained:
Limitation on Determination of Income. Notwithstanding any provision herein contained or
any rule of law applicable to the Charitable
Remainder Trust herein created to the contrary,
(1) proceeds from the sale or exchange of assets
contributed to the Charitable Remainder Trust
herein created must be allocated to the principal
and not to Trust income, at least to the extent of
the fair market value of those assets on the date
of contribution, (2) proceeds of the sale or exchange of assets purchased by the Charitable
Remainder Trust herein created must be allocated
to the principal and not to Trust income, at least
to the extent of the Trust’s purchase price of such
assets, and (3) trust income may not be determined by reference to a fixed percentage of the
annual fair market value of the trust property,
notwithstanding any contrary provision of applicable state law.
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